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CO CCA Riot After Action Report
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COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT Inmate Riot: Crowley County Correctional Facility July 20, 2004 October 1, 2004 After Action Report Inmate Riot: July 20, 2004 Crowley County Correctional Facility Prepared by: Nolin Renfrow, Director of Prisons Cherrie Greco, Legislative Liaison Anna Cooper, Prison Operations October 1, 2004 2 Table of Contents Colorado Department of Corrections Officials Page 5 Corrections Corporation of America Officials 5 CDOC Private Prisons Monitoring Unit Staff 5 Crowley County Commissioners 5 Part I Executive Summary • Introduction • History of Privatization • Statutory Authority • Organizational Work Force • Colorado Private Prison Operators • Housing Out of State Inmates in Private Prisons • Private Prison Monitoring Unit 6 6 7 10 10 11 11 11 Part II • • • 13 13 15 16 Information/Events leading up to Incident Reports from Staff and Inmates Recent PPMU Visits Crowley’s Level of Emergency Preparedness Part III Incident Summary • Chronological Order and Narrative Account of Events • Use of Force • Observations • Office of Inspector General: Investigations and Findings 17 17 56 57 58 Part IV Conclusion and Recommendations: • Conclusions • Recommendations • Emergency Preparedness 65 65 65 67 3 Appendices: Page: Photos: 70 – 89 Intergovernmental Contract – State of Colorado and the Colorado Department of Corrections and Crowley County and Exhibits 90– 177 Crowley County Correctional Facility Riot Response Expenses to be Reimbursed 178 Glossary 179 4 Colorado Department of Corrections Officials Joe Ortiz, Executive Director Nolin Renfrow, Director of Prisons L.D. Hay, Director of Administration and Finance Jeaneene E. Miller, Director, Adult Parole, Community Corrections & YOS, Mike Rulo, Inspector General, Madline SaBell, Director of Human Resources, Alison Morgan, Director of Public Affairs Cherrie Greco, Legislative Liaison Corrections Corporation of America Officials John D. Ferguson, President and CEO James A. Seaton, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Dr. Stephen W. Kaiser, Managing Dir., Facility Operations Division IV Josh Brown, Senior Director, Business Development Brent Crouse, Warden, Crowley County Correctional Facility Bill Bridges and Michael Miller, Associate Wardens, Crowley County Correctional Facility Private Prisons Monitoring Unit-Colorado Department of Corrections Michael Arellano, Unit Chief Terry Flanagan, CO III Security Specialist Sue Rael, Administrative Assistant Deborah Ahlin, CM II, Intelligence Specialist Gaynell Pritts, CM II, Monitor John Bongirno, GP III, Monitor Jim Webber, CM II, Monitor Dana Bustos, Mental Health Program Specialist Crowley County Commissioners T.E. (Tobe) Allumbaugh, Dwight Gardner, Mathew Heimerich, Warren Davis, Assessor; Mike McDonnell, Attorney; Lucile Nichols, Recorder; Jeff Keyes, Sheriff; Lynne Bauer, Treasurer; Bill Wilson, Crowley County Private Prison Monitor 5 Part I: Executive Summary Introduction On the evening of July 20, 2004, the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) was notified of an inmate disturbance which erupted in the recreation yard of the Crowley County Correctional Facility (CCCF). The facility is located approximately forty miles east of Pueblo on Highway 96, near the community of Olney Springs. CCCF is designated a Level III, or medium custody security correctional institution with an offender capacity of 1,144 dispersed throughout six cell houses (Cellhouse 5 construction incomplete at the time of the riot), including the recent completion of an additional 312-bed unit. There are no towers, although an observation deck is located over the gymnasium; observation cameras are located throughout. The facility is owned and operated by Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), Nashville, Tennessee. At approximately 7:30 P.M., the facility’s inmate population, many of whom were located in the recreational yard, began to disregard staff orders to clear the yard and openly displayed non-compliant behavior. A disturbance quickly escalated to the level of a riot, which included inmates destroying property, setting fires, seriously assaulting other inmates and, over the period of the next several hours, causing damage to the facility’s physical plant and security systems. Additional costs were incurred for emergency medical assistance, staff overtime, rehabilitation of buildings and grounds, as well as costs associated with the activation of emergency response teams, investigators, K-9 units and the Emergency Mobile Command Center, all deployed to assist with the uprising. During the days and weeks after the riot, over 1,400 investigative interviews were conducted by the Office of Inspector General, Colorado Department of Corrections. Colorado Bureau of Investigations agents were utilized to assist, as well as a Washington State Department of Corrections investigator, Crowley County Sheriff’s Office and the CCCF investigator. Information resulting from these interviews is found throughout the report. Extensive staff time by a number of other CDOC employees has resulted in the accumulation and compilation of critical details related to the incident. This document is being presented for the benefit of state government officials, the media, members of the general public and others for the purpose 6 of analyzing the facts and circumstances related to the incident. During the preparation of this report, a simultaneous criminal investigation was ongoing and being conducted by the Office of the Inspector General, Colorado Department of Corrections. Therefore, certain sensitive data which might be utilized during legal proceedings is referred to in this document in general terms only, so as not to compromise the process. Riots and disturbances in correctional institutions are complex and varied and often cannot be attributed to any single cause or groups of causes. Whether public or private, the correctional setting is, by its very nature, an unusual living environment, which may contribute to the emotional stress of those incarcerated. There are limited personal freedoms, monotony, regimentation, frustration, hopelessness, anxiety about family and friends and racial or other conflicts. However, correctional organizations are accustomed to utilizing management strategies which strive for fairness and parity with regard to conditions of confinement, treatment, education, training and necessary community reentry opportunities, while, at the same time, carrying out the orders of the court. For all involved, prison riots are fundamentally a threat to life and safety, which can turn a stressful environment into a tragedy. In the case of the Crowley riot, every attempt has been made to identify those elements that may have contributed to the incident, knowing full well that the propensity for any unrest can rarely be attributed to a single point of origin. Among the goals of this report, therefore, are conclusions and recommendations. Corrections professionals, whether working in publiclyoperated or private correctional facility environments, can often discover useful strategies from lessons learned, and, if acted on appropriately, may prevent riots of this magnitude in the future. History of Prison Privitization in Colorado In recent years, virtually every state in the Union has experienced rapid growth of their prison populations. In fact, Colorado’s inmate population exceeded CDOC’s physical capacity beginning in 1988. On September 2, 1988 the Colorado Department of Corrections moved 105 inmates to an empty, state owned facility in Washington. At that time, the Department's capacity for male inmates in other than community corrections beds was 7 4,547. Records show the on-grounds count was 4,517 with and additional 151 inmates off-grounds (out to court or in hospitals). Additionally, the county jails were holding 374 inmates that had been sentenced to the Department but were being held due to the lack of bed space. During the ten (10) year experience of housing inmates in out of state placement, the highest number was 1,684 in October, 1997 and the low was 13 in December, 1990. County jails became over crowded and lawsuits against the state were initiated in an effort to remove CDOC inmates. Court orders were issued and subsequent contempt citations filed to compel removal of state prisoners from county jails. No state beds were available, however, and a process of prioritization ensued, virtually pitting counties against each other. Early parole was not a viable option. The American Civil Liberties Union began to threaten litigation against Denver and Arapahoe Counties, forcing them to build new jail space. In all, the CDOC went to the Colorado Supreme Court three times seeking resolution. Consequently, county, state and private beds were contracted for in the states of Missouri, Minnesota, Washington, Wyoming and Texas. Offenders classified as medium custody and below were selected for out of state moves. During this period, a number of lawsuits were filed; however, the courts unanimously upheld CDOC’s position regarding these placements. Eventually, beds became available with the construction of additional state and privately funded facilities, so that, by December, 1998, all inmates had been returned to Colorado. Like most states, Colorado’s budget has been challenged for the past several years, virtually eliminating the availability of capital construction funding for additional, state-owned prison bed space. Therefore, partnerships have been further enhanced with the governmental entities where private prisons are constructed, in order to manage inmates and meet the state’s public safety mission. Today, approximately 2,797 Colorado offenders are housed in these facilities. Of that number, 121 are located in Tallahatchie County, Mississippi. The merits of privatization are often discussed with regard to differential costs, liability, level of oversight, staffing and quality of physical plant construction. The private prison industry is driven by a need created when the number of inmates exceeds the number of state owned beds. Simply, the public expects to be protected; if no state funds are available for prison construction, a market for private prisons exists, based upon the need for bed space at any given time. Arguments can be made for and against the 8 concept of private prisons. However, as of this date, due to the lack of sufficient public beds, the choice is stark; approximately 2,797 Colorado felons can either be placed in private facilities, in out of state facilities or on the street. For the most part, private prison operators are exempted from many governmental requirements with regard to purchasing and personnel management. While constructing and activating private correctional facilities can benefit local communities and provide positive economic impact, conversely, accessing and hiring sufficient numbers of employees to staff such institutions can be challenging. Contractual arrangements are made between the Colorado Department of Corrections and cities or counties where the facilities have been sited. A daily per diem rate, approved by the Colorado State Legislature each year, is paid to these local governments; they, in turn, create subcontracts with private prison operators. At present, a rate of $49.56 is being paid per inmate, per day in Colorado. $51.00 is being paid to Tallahatchie County in Mississippi for Colorado inmates being housed there. This fee does not cover case management oversight, transportation or non-routine medical care for TCCF. The arrangement is often known as the “Customer Model” whereby a level of services is defined, in keeping with standards imposed by the American Correctional Association, CDOC regulations, state and federal law. Which offenders are best placed in privately owned beds? Bed management for CDOC’s offender population is driven by a number of factors: trends in population growth, average length of stay, new criminal laws and sentences, parole populations, community corrections, rate of revocation, medical and mental health needs, other special program needs, as well as an inmate’s ability to progress to a less secure environment. Further, the department’s classification system characterizes levels of risk, which ultimately influences facility placement. With this is mind, the Colorado Department of Corrections houses the most difficult to manage inmates, with behavior and custody issues, as well as those with advanced medical and mental health conditions, while the private facilities provide only moderate medical care to relatively healthy inmates classified at medium custody and below. Prior to release for parole or discharge, offenders are returned to CDOC facilities for out-processing. 9 Statutory Authority The Colorado Revised Statutes governing authorization of CDOC to place offenders in private prisons, expectations regarding performance and oversight are found in Title 17. Private facilities are expected to follow CDOC Administrative Regulations where specified, as defined in the contracts. Waivers may be requested and granted for those regulations that do not apply. Organizational Work Force Observable differences exist between the private and public prison workforce, and the two can be compared in several ways. In both the private and public sectors, program opportunities have been developed, providing inmates with treatment, education, work and leisure time activities. Speciallytrained and credentialed staff are responsible for implementing and managing such programs. Operational support from food service, clinical services and case management are provided by employees trained in correctional security and other fields germane to their duties and responsibilities. However, unlike employees at private prisons, alignment of the Colorado Department of Corrections’ staff is designed and structured with positions defined by the classification system of Department of Personnel and Administration. Private prison staff are generally “at-will”, hourly employees, and company policies dictate operational decision-making nation-wide. While searching, screening and hiring qualified staff is challenging in both the private and public sectors, the staff attrition rate at CCA in Colorado is double that of staff employed by the Colorado Department of Corrections, thus making it more difficult to establish long held traditions or utilize the benefit of experienced staff. For example, years of policy development, practice and understanding the changing dynamics of a prison’s population have created a culture where the mission is readily understood in publiclyoperated institutions. To that end, it is not unusual for CDOC staff to spend years serving in volunteer capacities with specialized response units; i.e., Escape Teams, Tracking, Emergency Response Teams (ERT) and Special Operations Response Teams (SORT). Regularly scheduled training affords these groups with the confidence needed to mobilize swiftly and perform as needed. Over time, a sense of “community” has evolved, statewide, where professional relationships have developed regarding all matters of offender 10 management. For their part, offenders know that attempts to defeat security will be summarily thwarted by a confident and experienced staff. However, this sense of preparedness is more difficult to achieve among private prisons. Colorado Private Prison Operators At present, Corrections Corporation of America operates four facilities in Colorado: Crowley County Correctional Facility, Bent County Correctional Facility, Kit Carson Correctional Center and Huerfano County Correctional Center. In addition, GRW Corporation owns and operates an adult female facility at Brush. Besides housing Colorado inmates, the states of Washington, Wyoming and Hawaii have contracted for bed space in some of these facilities. Housing Out of State Inmates in Colorado’s Private Prisons Private prison operators assume a substantial investment when the decision is made to site a facility in Colorado. Costs associated with construction, utility plant upgrades, and other infrastructure improvements are sizable, but are intended to be recovered when daily bed capacity is attained. Keeping beds filled is essential to realizing the full return on investment. Therefore, when other states reach their own capacity and seek bed space elsewhere, it is not uncommon for CDOC offenders being housed in private corrections institutions to share facility space with other states’ inmates. Through the authority of CDOC’s Executive Director (CRS 17.1.104.5), the Private Prisons Monitoring Unit reviews inmate files for suitability and appropriateness of placement, prior to inmates’ being transferred to Colorado. Individual states vary with regard to the daily rate being paid to the private operator or other conditions established in their contracts. Private Prisons Monitoring Unit (PPMU) Per CRS 17-1-202(1) (a) (III) (g): The Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections shall monitor the contracted private correctional facilities. Until the passage of HB04-1419, all operating expenses and personal services to monitor the private facilities were 11 reimbursed quarterly by the contracted entities. Today, however, the PPMU is General Funded and the daily rate to counties and cities has been reduced accordingly. The purpose of the PPMU is to monitor and provide oversight of private facilities and their operations. Per CRS 17-1-202 (1) (a) (III) (f): The contractor shall be responsible for a range of services and programs at least equal to those services and programs provided by the CDOC at comparable state correctional facilities. Site visits are conducted on a regular basis to monitor consistency with CDOC in such areas as the following: • • • • • • • • • • • • Facility and Contract Oversight Selective Training for Private Prison Staff Security Audits Case Management Oversight Mental Health Treatment Program Reviews Medical and Dental Oversight Security Threat Group Monitoring Drug Interdiction Food Service Monitoring Program Reviews for Education and Treatment Inmate Banking Background Checks for Visitors The PPMU recognizes that tracking and follow-up to these areas are essential in order to manage small issues before they develop into larger, security-related problems. Therefore, monitor-observed deficiencies are documented, brought to the attention of the institution’s management, and, where appropriate, to the contractor. Ideally, a cooperative remedy is discussed and agreed upon. The relationship between the Colorado Department of Corrections and the private prisons is mutually beneficial only when the latter fulfill the terms and conditions of the contract. When contract deficiencies are noted, however, and the private prison delays in the implementation of needed corrections, PPMU staff are obligated to document and report to the CDOC Executive Staff. The practice of monitoring and evaluating conditions of confinement for CDOC inmates housed in private facilities is critical for the ongoing contractual relationship to be successful. This relationship has been impeded by lack of responsiveness by private prison operators to issues identified for improvement by PPMU staff. For example, failure of private prison staff to demonstrate a fundamental knowledge of appropriate policy and procedures is 12 one of the most frustrating issues. Attention to physical plant repairs, kitchen cleanliness, menu and food portions, medical staffing and services, as well as basic security practices are of such importance that, when ignored, these concerns can quickly escalate and eventually impact the safety and security of the entire facility. At present, there are few mechanisms in place for holding private operators or contractors accountable when deficiencies are delayed or never corrected. Part II: Events Prior to the July 20th Incident Reports From Staff and Inmates In any prison riot, it can be difficult to distinguish valid warning signs from false ones. In this case, some factors have emerged, linking conditions for the time period prior to the incident with the actual disturbance. During the days prior to July 20, 2004, 198 inmates from the state of Washington were moved to the Crowley Facility. They, along with 116 inmates from Wyoming and 807 Colorado inmates, brought the facility’s total population to 1,130. The investigation conducted by the CDOC Office of Inspector General, indicates that the inmates were angry over real or perceived inequity of treatment. For example, the amount of inmate wages paid by each state per month for similar inmate work assignments is different, ranging from $60.00 paid to Washington and Wyoming inmates, while Colorado pays $18.60 per month. Colorado requires it’s inmates to contribute each month to court/victims’ restitution owed, child support and medical appointment copayments. Buying power is strongest, therefore, among Washington and Wyoming inmates. The CDOC Inspector General concluded that resentment developed over this difference. Other complaints have become known as a result of the ongoing investigation: • Several inmates alleged that two instances of misuse of force by Crowley County Correctional (CCCF) staff occurred. • Inmates’ complaints and criticisms about food quality and quantity were allegedly ignored by the food service manager. • Inmates’ perception that an alleged conflict of interest exists between canteen operations and food service operations as Canteen Corporation owns and operates both. 13 • Inmates’ allegations of treatment disparity between Colorado inmates and Washington inmates regarding allowable property and food portions. • Inmates’ allegations that administration failed to listen or acknowledge inmate complaints. • Inmates’ allegations that on the day of the riot, facility administration ignored requests to discuss issues and grievances. • CCCF staff’s and inmates’ perception that facility administration had prior warnings or knowledge of a potential riot; information may have been provided in staff reports and inmate letters and memos from inmates to staff. • CCCF staff’s and inmates’ perception that too many new, untrained facility staff were assigned to key posts. • CCCF staff’s perception that there were too few resources to manage the riot. • CCCF staff’s perception that the facility was understaffed on the night of the riot. These complaints, leading to continued and progressive frustrations among the population, were reportedly aired to line staff and administration in the days prior to the actual riot. In addition to complaints, the investigation has revealed that three CCCF staff members submitted reports to CCCF Supervisory Staff noting possible trouble forthcoming from inmates. The first report, dated May 15, 2004, indicated that a Wyoming inmate made veiled threats during an altercation with staff saying that he would “make his point on July 5.” (July 5, 2004 was the designated time frame for a second group of Washington inmates to arrive at CCCF) The second report is dated July 5, 2004. An inmate, who asked not to be identified, communicated to staff that Washington inmates planned to take an officer hostage. The third report submitted from staff (no date) indicated that the reporting officer had overheard inmates talk about “getting even” with the people who hurt another inmate on the East Yard basketball court. According to the staff member, inmates said they would “fight it out” in Unit C. It is unknown what action was taken by CCA to follow-up on any of these reports. 14 Recent PPMU Visits Site visit reports for the six month period prior to the disturbance indicate that monitors noted and communicated a number of concerns to facility management. The following is a partial list of issues: • Food quality and quantity • Inconsistency in completing required forms for reportable incidents • Training for food service staff in the preparation of medical and religious diets • Emergency plans compliance • Emergency Response Teams staffing and training • Use of ambulance and emergency room services for routine medical care • Pharmaceutical management • Mental health and medical treatment staff ratios • Tracking Security Threat Group intelligence • Timeliness of gang activity report filings • Staff termination reports • Investigations and Code of Penal Discipline Reports • Accuracy of Quarterly Reports • Canteen pricing structure and items sold • Inmate telephone services contract • Case manager attrition since January, 2004 • Escape team training • Facility organization charts • Inmate grievance process • Inmate banking account activity and records • Inmate access to computers in food service area • Other recent audits include: ¾ June 30, 2004 ¾ March 30, 2004 ¾ April 4, 2004 Monthly security inspection Quarterly key inventory/inspection Quarterly tool inventory 15 ¾ January 12, 2004 Evaluation of communications equipment ¾ July 23, 2003 Crowley County Commissioners approved CCCF’s Emergency Plan On July 9, 2004, a CDOC monitor visited the Crowley facility. The report, filed, July 13, noted that offender morale appeared to be “low” with regard to food quality, and inmates complained of not earning enough money to purchase needed canteen items. Crowley’s Level of Emergency Preparedness Besides reports analyzed from staff, inmates and monitors, regarding the Crowley riot, a review of recent security systems inspections, staffing matters and frequency of emergency activation drills is also important. While these areas of concern may not have directly impacted the start of the disturbance, the ability to gain control of the situation may have been hampered by the breakdown of any or all of these essential operational elements of the institution. The following information is known about the status of the facility’s emergency preparedness, prior to July 20, 2004. Staffing Complement: Not fully staffed; new employees on the job for two days or less when riot erupted. Emergency Plan: Failed to achieve contract compliance in the area of developing an emergency plan consistent with CDOC Administrative Regulation 300-30RD, making mutual response more complicated. Emergency Response Failed to maintain a recommended percentage of Teams: emergency response team members (5% of offender population) Armory Practices: Failed to gain compliance in the area of armory management and practices. Barber Tool Control: The facility recently moved the Barber Shops into the Living Units. (This practice contributed to the loss of Class A tools during the riot.) Emergency Activation Rarely conducted. Drills For example, on one occasion, an inmate was utilized to participate in an emergency drill, causing a staff member, unaware the exercise was in progress, to draw a weapon on him. 16 Training: Training was provided for 7 staff members on the topic of munitions and crowd control on April 29, 2004. On May 27, 2004, 6 staff received other specialized training, and on June 3, 2004, 11 staff completed firearms requalifications. Part III: Incident Summary Chronological Order and Narration of Events Note Physical Plant Layout: The physical plant layout of the Crowley County Correctional Facility runs from east to west with the main entry and Administration Offices (Building A) being in the center of the facility on the north side perimeter. Living Units 1 and 2 are located on the west side of the baseball field with access to the programs areas located on the south side of the facility. A security fence separates the west side from the east and includes Living Units 3 and 4. The east side also includes a large exercise yard, basketball court and weight pile. Living Unit 6, located on the west side was recently constructed, and, at the time of the riot was occupied by Washington inmates. Unit 6 lies outside the main complex on the southwest side, separated by security fences from the main facility compound. The facility program and support area (Building B) is located on the south side of the compound, directly across from Building A, separated by the two large exercise yards. A greenhouse sits just to the southwest side of the programs area building. Another building (furniture shop) is known as Building G and is located to the southeast of the programs area on the south side of the East Yard. On the night of the riot the Crowley County Correctional Facility had an inmate population of 1144 inmates with 22 inmates being off grounds. There were 807 Colorado inmates, 198 Washington State inmates and 117 Wyoming inmates on grounds at the time the disturbance occurred. There were 47 CCCF employees on posts with 33 officers working in security and housing related posts on grounds, 3 were food service employees, 3 were medical personnel, and 8 additional staff (new hires) were doing their FTO (Field Training or OJT on the job training). There was also a librarian, two religious volunteers, and two electrical contractor employees on grounds at the time the incident started. 17 July 20, 2004 7:00 – 7:30 PM On July 20th at approximately 7:05 PM, inmates were released to the West Recreation Yard. Large groups reportedly began to assemble at approximately 7:30 demanding an audience with the Warden over some complaints. The inmates making the demands were confronted by a Shift Commander a Captain who denied their demands to talk with the Warden but, reportedly attempted to engage the group’s leader concerning their demands. It was reported that the Captain was unsuccessful in attempts to find a spokesman for the group and that the group became threatening towards the Captain and other officers present. They retreated from the yard for their own safety. At the Shift Commanders direction, a public address system announcement was made giving an order to all inmates in the yard to disperse and return to their living units, and announcing that the yard was closed. The inmates became unruly, started to become hostile and refused the directives to return to their living units. Captain Garcia notified Warden Crouse and 2 deputy wardens, Miller and Bridges. CCCF Chief Selman and SORT Commander Jaramillo were on grounds. The order was given for Living Units to lock their doors and for staff to prepare for an emergency evacuation from their posts. Once the officers evacuated the yards and Living Units, the inmates began moving back into Housing Units 1 and 2, and, using parts of free weights, began breaking windows. As the incident escalated from a disobedience of directives, the inmates became bolder and began engaging in more violent conduct. Inmates began doing property damage, inciting other inmates to riot, and threatening to breach the living unit security doors. The inmates realized that their conduct was unchecked and there was no officer presence to stop them. They began to engage in more flagrant criminal misconduct. Living Unit 1 and 2 case management offices were then broken into, furniture and equipment was demolished. Rioting inmates rifled through case management records and files looking for information on other inmates considered to be police 18 informants (snitches) and sex offenders who were then targeted for assault. 7:30 – 8:00 P.M. The Unit Control Center staff who had no means in place to defend the Units when the riot started, abandoned their posts through roof escape hatches. They were unable to secure the hatch doors, which allowed inmates access to the roof of the living units and inmates also climbed a drain pipe outside the building to gain access to the roof. Inmates breached the Control Center security doors in Units 1 and 2 by 7:52 P.M. and totally destroyed the electronic control center panels and security systems. Private Prisons Monitoring Unit (PPMU) Chief Michael Arellano is notified by PPMU Duty Officer of the incident at CCCF. Mr. Arellano notified Offender Services Manager, Bill Zalman and Prison Operations Manager, Lou Archuleta. Mr. Arellano assessed the situation with CCCF Warden Crouse and maintained communication with Mr. Zalman and Director of Prisons, Mr. Renfrow, while they were in route to CCCF. 8:00 – 8:30 P.M. By approximately 8:04 P.M., the Crowley County Sheriff’s Department was notified. Simultaneously, rioting inmates began to release segregated inmates and continued destroying property. Two officers in Unit 2 were left behind on the unit floor by control room officers when they abandoned their posts. The two officers were forced to hide from rioting inmates by locking themselves in a cell in the segregation unit. Windows, furniture, plumbing fixtures, filing cabinets, appliances, sections of walls and doors were broken in Unit 2 by inmates using weight bars and free weights from the weight piles. There was extensive damage in all Living Unit case management offices. Documents, records and other files were destroyed by burning them outside in the yard or by water damage. Most offices and Control Center equipment and furnishings were completely destroyed by the rampaging inmates with inmates having set several small fires within case manager’s offices and control 19 centers by burning debris within them. Vending machines were damaged, rifled through, and the contents were stolen. Televisions were destroyed along with inmates’ washing machines and dryers. The interiors of Living Units 1 and 2 sustained heavy, significant water damage due to flooding caused by breakage of porcelain toilets and sinks along with damage to water lines and sprinkler systems. Other damage was sustained by units and security systems were defeated. At 8:11 P.M., inmates had begun to break into maintenance and canteen areas of the institution and the first scatter shots of rubber pellets were fired by CCCF SORT members in an effort to disperse the groups. PPMU staff Deb Ahlin reported receiving a call from Captain Garcia of CCCF in Master Control. Captain Garcia indicated that the facility was experiencing a disturbance involving approximately 150-200 inmates from Washington, Wyoming and Colorado on the West yard. Captain Garcia indicated that staff had been called into the Control Centers and were off of the yard. Garcia indicated that he would remain in Master Control for further notifications and instructions. The two CCCF Officers, Bachicha and Verela, who were forced to hide from rioting inmates by locking themselves in a cell in the segregation unit in Unit 2 were in extreme danger as rioting inmates were advancing on the cell door. CCCF Chief Selman authorized use of a control agent (hand held OC canisters) to move inmates back so that CCCF SORT could allow their officers to exit. PPMU Chief Arellano contacted PPMU staff Curtis Robinette and directed him to respond immediately to CCCF. CCCF Warden Crouse arrived at facility and assumed role as Incident Manager and instructed staff member Baylor to continue working on staff accountability. Trapped officers in Unit 2 were freed from the segregation cell by CCCF SORT. 20 CDOC Director of Prisons, Nolin Renfrow, while in route to CCCF, ordered chemical agents to be used to control rioting inmates; i.e., CS and CN gas. Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility and Fort Lyon Correctional Facility Emergency Response Teams were placed on standby. However, chemical agents were not deployed by CCCF; the Warden was waiting for approval from Corporate headquarters. CDOC SORT Team Leaders report that Alpha and Bravo squads had been contacted and were ready to report to CCCF in full mission gear. 8:30 – 9:00 PM PPMU staff Curtis Robinette arrives at CCCF. PPMU staff Ahlin departs her residence and is instructed by Mr. Arellano to contact PPMU staff Gaynell Pritts, Terry Flanagan, John Bongirno, and Dana Bustos, who were placed on stand-by. Ms. Ahlin contacted Gaynell Pritts while in route and instructed her to make further staff notifications. CDOC PIO Alison Morgan notifies the Governor’s Office of the situation. CCCF Chief Selman instructed Lt. Luna to go to zone 5 to attempt to push inmates away from CCCF Greenhouse. Seven CCCF SORT members were on grounds and Unit 6A Pod was locked down. Deputy Warden Miller and Unit 6 Manager Satterly arrived at CCCF. Emergency Command Center opened. Warden Miller was the Incident Management Team Leader, staff member Baylor was the Incident Management Team Support; Officer Virginia Lewis was the temporary Public Information Officer and Unit Manager Satterly reports staff accountability and plans to move inmates. Manager Satterly assumes staff accountability. CCCF Officer Griffith and Captain Garcia were not responding to radio calls. Chief Selman gave the order to fire rubber pellets and bird shot attempting to get inmates to retreat from B Building. Deputy Warden Miller attempted to contact Dr. Kaiser, Managing Director of Facility Operations, Division IV. PPMU staff Robinette received a briefing from Deputy Warden Miller in Emergency Command Center at CCCF. 21 Warden Miller briefed the CCCF SORT Team and indicated that Living Units 3 & 4 were secured, but a few offenders remained in the East yard. Approximately 150200 inmates were in the West yard causing facility disruption. Unit 4 inmates continued to be non-compliant with lockdown orders and inmates were advancing on BBuilding. Chief Selman authorized less lethal ammo and instructs CCCF SORT Team to push inmates toward Unit 6. Fires were ignited by rioting inmates outside Units 1 and 2 using flammable materials such as clothing, mattresses, files, and papers stuffed into microwaves, washers, dryers, and file cabinets dragged from inside the units. Inmates had breached control rooms in Units 1 and 2. CDOC Director of Prisons, Mr. Renfrow, contacted CDOC SORT Commander to activate Alpha and Bravo squads and activated the AVCF and FLCF ERT members who were ordered to report to CCCF. CCCF Deputy Warden Miller was in the CCCF conference room with Captain Garcia and Officer Griffith. Mr. Renfrow contacted CCCF Emergency Command Center and repeated orders to utilize chemical agents prior to his arrival at CCCF. He was informed that approval was being sought by CCCF Warden Crouse from the corporate office in Nashville; however, authorization had not yet been received. CCCF Chief Selman reported inmates were backed up between Units 1 and 6. Inmates defeated one 6 foot fence and a 12 foot security fence in order to gain access to the Greenhouse and a fire is reported. The fire ignited in front of Unit 1 had flames reaching 20-30 feet into the air. Fire Department staff were on site were notified and CCCF SORT members are deployed to escort fire trucks. Inmates in the East Yard are beginning to remove weights from the weight pile. Inmates were yelling, throwing rocks, and some were sitting on the ground. CCCF SORT members were firing rubber pellets to attempt to contain and disperse rioting inmates. 22 PPMU staff Robinette was informed that all staff were accounted for. CCA Corporate Public Information Officer Steve Owen, received notification and drafted an initial release and made local media contact. Notification was made to local CCCF Public Information Officer, Lori Pinkerton. PPMU staff member Robinette reported that a CDOC SORT member, Deputy Warden Miller and the Crowley County Sheriff, Jeff Keys reviewed facility diagrams. 9:00 – 9:30 PM DOC SORT Teams, Charlie, Delta, and Sniper squads were activated to report to CCCF. Inmates were reported to be cutting through a fence along side Unit 1. The Crowley County, Otero County and Pueblo Sheriffs’ Offices were on grounds, as well as Colorado State Patrol personnel. Mr. Renfrow verified that the CCCF perimeter was secure and fortified with additional staff support. Mr. Renfrow activated the AVCF SORT members and ERT Team. CCCF Deputy Warden Miller made contact with PPMU Chief Arellano. The CDOC Emergency Support Center in Colorado Springs was activated with Offender Services Director, Bill Zalman, in command, and Manager of Prison Operations, Lou Archuleta. PPMU Chief Arellano arrived at CCCF. PPMU staff Robinette was directed to perform as a monitor, and to assign staff liaison for fire and police departments. CCCF staff attempted to contact Washington State contract monitors. CCCF Emergency Support Center reported 10 Kit Carson and 11 Bent County SORT Team members were in route. Huerfano County Correctional Facility had activated their SORT. An Incident Management Team was assembled in CCCF Emergency Command and an Operations Plan was being developed. Captain Garcia called in CCCF off-duty staff to assist. Public Information Officer Pinkerton attempted to secure Olney Springs Public Library for Media Center. Deputy Warden Bridges was assigned to handle media staging. CCCF staff located three working video cameras. Identification of inmates was begun, documenting via video camera, establishing 23 lists, etc. CCCF staff made additional attempts to reach Washington State contract officials and left messages. First media representatives arrived at the facility. PPMU Chief Arellano contacted CDOC Emergency Support Center and reported inmates were entering Cellhouse 1, 2, 3, and 4, tearing out everything they could and placing items in front of entry doors. Uninvolved inmates from CH-3 are being pulled out of side doors by CCCF staff. Mr. Arellano was on the roof of the Administration Building and observed 200-300 inmates in the yard. Unit 1 fire escape door was breached and inmates were getting on the roof. CCCF staff attempted to contact Marty Lyons, the Washington State contract monitor, who was in route from Pueblo. First entry onto the incident area occurred with teams comprised of approximately 15 CCCF SORT members, 7 AVCF ERT members, and 5 CDOC SORT members. Additional CDOC SORT members arrived at CCCF. One CDOC SORT Team Leader reported to the CCCF Emergency Command Center for briefing. CCCF Unit 3 Officers were instructed to begin escape to the roof. Permission was obtained to use Olney Springs library for media staging. CCCF Unit 4 Officers escaped to the roof. CDOC SORT members assisted in rescue of CCCF Officers from roof of Units 3 & 4. CCCF Business Manager Frazier was notified of riot at CCCF. Contact was made with Wyoming State Contract Monitor, Mike Wise, who was in route to CCCF. CCCF Deputy Warden Miller indicated he did not have enough staff on grounds to handle the Operations Plan. The AVCF SORT members arrived on grounds. Chemical agents and rubber pellets were being utilized to hold rioting inmates back temporarily. The first EMS team arrived on grounds. Nick Hobbs, CCCF Maintenance, arrived on grounds. 24 9:30 – 10:00 PM The entire CDOC 19 member SORT team was fully activated and on site at CCCF. SORT Commander assumed command in the CCCF Emergency Command Center, and directed CCCF staff to contact AVCF to obtain additional less lethal munitions and Self Contained Breathing Apparatus equipment as CCCF reported they did not have this equipment on grounds. CCCF Captain Garcia joined the ground operators and CDOC SORT members assumed sniper positions on the Administration Building. CCCF Deputy Warden Bridges assigned PIO Pinkerton with one correctional officer to go to the media staging area in Olney Springs. PPMU Chief Arellano approved the press statement prepared by CCCF PIO Steve Owen and was awaiting Washington and Wyoming contract monitoring staff approval. CCCF Deputy Warden Bridges assumed the role of Planning Team Leader. CCCF Business Manager Frazier, Human Resources staff, Nichelle Valdez, and Program Manager, Hale arrived at the facility. SORT staff from CCA Bent County Correctional Facility, Huerfano County Correctional Facility and Kit Carson Correctional Center were in route. 10:00 - 10:30 PM The SORT ground operators were staged outside the emergency entrance of Unit 3, along with mixed ERT teams from FLCF, AVCF, CCCF, and BCCF. SORT Team Leader took command of the combined SORT from CDOC and CCCF, and began to enter Unit 3 to take control. Chemical agents were utilized with 870 Remington shotgun, Ispra Jet, and 37MM Baton Launcher. Barricades in front of doors were broken through by the Team members upon entry. CN and OC gas was dispersed. The weapon teams penetrated the hallway into the main entry outside the pods quickly without any offender opposition. The remainder of the Entry Team, including cuff and retention personnel, staged outside the pod covering each door to prevent any offenders from escaping the pods. CDOC and CCCF SORT and ERT 25 members entered “A Pod” lead by CDOC SORT members. Upon entry, gas was dispersed and less lethal rounds consisting of 12 gauge high velocity stingers and FIN stabilized rubber rounds were fired at offenders who were involved in the disruption inside the Pod. Offenders returned to their cells and control of the Pod was obtained by the Team. Cuff and retention teams entered the Pod and extraction of offenders began. The Pod was cleared by SORT members and cover was provided during detainment and securing of the offenders; Unit 3 was secured without incident. All inmates were removed to west side of Unit 3. The building’s interior sustained excessive damage to include approximately 1” of standing water throughout, flooded tiers, damaged and destroyed furniture and fixtures, broken plumbing, trash and debris throughout. CDOC Training Academy Director, Ross Kimbrell, was notified of the CCCF emergency by Cherrie Greco, Legislative Liaison. Mr. Kimbrell further notified Jere Chaddick, Training Academy staff. Ms. Chaddick initiated the shipment of 22 cases of less lethal ammunition and two electronic shields that had arrived at CTA armory. Bent County Correctional Facility SORT arrived on CCCF grounds. CDOC SORT Team Leader advised Bravo squad that snipers had been placed on the roof of the Administration Building. Intelligence reported that during the earlier stage of the disturbance offenders had gained access to the roof tops of some of the units and that inmates had barricaded themselves in Unit 2. Bravo squad was ordered to deploy to Unit 2 and the Pods were cleared in the same manner as Unit 3. SORT entered Unit 2 C&D Pods preceded by chemical agents and pods were secured. SORT also entered Unit 3, B and A Pods were secured with out further incident. CDOC SORT remained in secured pods until further assistance could arrive. A small group of Bravo squad and ERT officers were ordered to clear the roof top of Unit 2. Access was gained 26 through the control room which had been defeated and occupied by the offenders, but was clear upon SORT entry. CDOC SORT members proceeded to clear the roof encountering no opposition or offender threats. Officers on the roof observed approximately 15-20 inmate rioters on the ground throwing rocks, debris, and burning devices at a small group of officers barricaded outside the Unit’s main entry into the yard. The offenders were attacking the officers using metal wall lockers as shields. Assisted by the ground units, CDOC officers dispersed gas toward the offenders from the roof. The offenders then began to attack the squad on the roof with rocks and debris. No injuries were sustained by the squad positioned on the roof and the squad was then ordered to withdraw and join the defending team on the ground. As the squad re-entered the building, the rioters were under control and were being contained by cuff and retention teams. All of the offenders that were involved and detained were then escorted and placed in the holding cells outside “D Pod”. Wyoming State Contract Monitor Mike Wise was briefed in Warden Crouse’s Office. CCCF Chief Selman reports staff from Unit 3 and 4 were off roofs and safe. Fires continued burning in the Greenhouse and outside the doors of Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit 4. The yard was under staff control and the offenders were secured and being closely observed. CCA PIO Steve Owens was notified of the current situation by Lori Pinkerton, CCCA Public Information Officer. PPMU Chief Arellano reported inmates were calling the press from inside the Units. Inmate phones were shut off to prevent further media contact. Deputy Warden Miller reported wooden cell doors had been removed and were stacked in the yard by the inmates. Mr. Arellano and CCCF Warden Crouse were requesting information of available segregation beds from other DOC and CCA facilities to be faxed to them to begin assigning alternate housing for an undetermined number of inmates. CDOC Emergency Support Center staff contacted AVCF to deploy extra staff for assistance at CCCF. AVCF 27 Associate Warden Hartley deployed additional staff coming off swing shift. Mr. Arellano also requested additional assistance from LCF through Emergency Support Center staff. CDOC Prison Operations Manager, Lou Archuleta, in the Emergency Support Center, contacted Carolyn Sutherland to arrange to have CDOC Clinical Staff assist. Health Service Administrators Kellie McRae (AVCF), Renae Jordan (YOS, PMC, TCF), Jerri Green (SCCF), and Betty Salas (FLCF) were notified. Ms. McRae had already been activated by AVCF’s Emergency Plan and the other clinical staff were contacted to report to CCCF at 5:00 a.m. on 7-21-04. CCA PIO Steve Owens faxed a press release to local and national media outlets. PPMU Intelligence Specialist Deb Ahlin arrived at CCCF. CM II PPMU Monitor Pritts contacted Mental Health Specialist Dana Bustos to be on stand-by for incident briefing. Training Academy Director Ross Kimbrell and Jere Chaddick had retrieved 22 cases of less lethal ammunition, 60 sets of hard restraints, and two electronic shields and were in route to CCCF at 10:30 p.m. Emergency Support Center contacted Limon Correctional Facility Captain Lockhart and LCF ERT call-out was initiated. A page was sent to contact Doug Armstrong, Central Transportation Unit Lieutenant, advising him to get transport buses to CCCF. Business Technology staff, Molly Hamilton, was contacted and advised that she would provide technical support for CDOC Emergency Mobil Command Center. PPMU Chief Arellano notifies CDOC ESC that the use of CS gas had been approved by CCA for deployment. Mr. Arellano also reported inmates were burning wooden cell doors in the yard in front of Unit 4. CDOC K-9 units arrive. 10:30 – 11:00 PM CCCF staff member Baylor reported contact from CDOC Emergency Support Center Commander Zalman and advised LCF ERT were in route to CCCF. 28 Transport security measures for injured inmates were uncertain. One unconscious inmate was brought to the entry gate and transported out for medical treatment. Reports from staff to CCCF Public Information Officer indicates 2 inmates down. Emergency Support Center Commander Zalman contacted PPMU Chief Arellano with plans to move offenders to other facilities. CDOC Director of Prisons Renfrow directed the AVCF ERT to move to the CCCF parking lot to provide facility entry security. Reports were received into CCCF Command Center of a possible injured inmate in Unit 2. SORT teams were divided and begin investigating Unit 2. 1000 flexcuffs reported in the facility by CCCF staff Baylor. CDOC Director of Clinical Services Barry Pardus, was contacted by the Director of Finance and Administration L. D. Hay, about the CCCF incident. CDOC Limon Correctional Facility initial ERT members began to report. Lt. Butler reported to LCF staff to issue weapons and munitions from the armory. Ten LCF staff responded to the facility with additional staff reporting to CCCF from Colorado Springs. Channel 9 news from Denver arrived at CCCF. Approximately 30 inmates were still in the yard causing a disturbance. SORT, ERT and Medical staff were advised to be ready for smoke inhalation victims due to the fires burning outside the Units. Deputy Warden Bridges advised Emergency Medical teams to be ready with oxygen. PPMU Chief Arellano reported 6 inmates were observed on the roof of Unit 1 breaking up air conditioning system and the roof was on fire. A group of inmates with shields were seen entering and leaving Unit 2. Channel 5 News and Rocky Ford Gazette were at press staging area in Olney Springs. CCCF Public Information Officer Pinkerton went to the press staging area in Olney Springs to provide an update. CDOC Director of Prisons, Nolin Renfrow, Director of Administration and Finance, L. D. Hay, and Director of Business Technology, Paul Lewin, arrived at CCCF. 29 Business Technology staff were called in to operate and monitor all LAN and WEB communications. 11:00 – 11:30 PM CDOC Emergency Support Center contacted CTU Rick Martinez to move the CDOC Emergency Mobile Command Center to the Crowley County Correctional Facility. Pueblo Complex ERT was activated and ordered to report to San Carlos to prepare for a response to Crowley County Correctional Facility. While in route to CCCF, CDOC Inspector General Mike Rulo, contacted CCCF Command Center for an up-date. Triage was being set up by CDOC and CCCF Nursing staff and they were asking for a back up team to report. Mr. Rulo reported helicopter support was being requested, two Flight for Life and one military. PPMU Chief Arellano contacted CDOC Emergency Support Center requesting medical supplies from nearby facilities; two inmate injuries were reported so far. They were being transported to St. Mary Corwin Hospital for treatment. Inmates were being pulled out of Unit 3 and being restrained in grass area of the yard. The largest concentration of inmates were visible in front of Unit 6 where there were an estimated 200-300 inmates. CDOC and CCCF SORT and ERT were at vantage points. PPMU Chief Arellano notified CDOC ESC that Washington State Monitoring Staff had established a command center with Executive Director Lehman in command. CDOC San Carlos Correctional Facility ERT Commander Lt. Randy Cordova, reported to SCCF and was informed by Associate Warden Rod Cozzetto to fully arm with lethal and less lethal ammunition and report to CCCF when the remainder of the team was on site and prepared. SCCF Warden Leyba briefed Tim Desiata and Randy Cordova regarding the incident in CCCF. San Carlos Correctional Facility and Pueblo Complex deployed 16 ERT members. 30 CDOC Emergency Support Center advised CCCF Command Center that Park County advises 50 vacant beds available. Command Center received information that 5-7 inmates had gained access to “G” building and others were advancing to that location. Inmates were attempting to pull down the light outside Unit 1; they were successful. Inmates continued feeding fires outside Units 1 and 2. 11:30 – 12:00 PM Combined SORT members were deployed to south side of “G” building and deployed 2 chemical agents towards group advancing to “G” building, causing inmates to move away. East yard inmates placed their hands on their heads and proceed to basketball court and lie on their stomachs. Retention Team immediately established and restrained inmates on East yard. A fire alarm is going off in “G” building. CDOC Emergency Support Center had advised Carolyn Sutherland that 6 CDOC Medical Staff would arrive at CCCF at 5:00 a.m. to assist. CDOC SORT members were inside entry door to Unit 2. Inmates began throwing rocks and using filing cabinets as shields to advance on SORT inside Unit 2. CCCF Chief of Security Selman and Captain Palomino deployed three (3) 515 triple chaser chemical agents onto the advancing inmates. Inmates retreated into the existing crowd. CDOC SORT forms skirmish line that inmates attempt to flank. A second DOC SORT team was dispatched from “G” building to intercept inmates trying to flank first SORT team. Skirmish lines advanced on inmates forcing retreat to fenced area in front of Unit 6. Approximately 75% of the inmates surrendered and lie on stomachs as ordered. CCCF and CDOC SORT were attempting to put out the fire in front of Unit 2 July 21, 2004 12:00 - 12:30 AM CDOC Youth Offender Services and Pueblo Minimum Center activated Emergency Command Centers. 31 Less lethal CS grenades were deployed on remaining 25% of inmates who continue throwing rocks at combined SORT and refused orders to lie down. CDOC CTU staff Rick Martinez advised Emergency Support Center that Emergency Mobile Command Center was in route with 1 driver and 2 operators. All inmates on West yard complied with orders to lie on their stomachs and cease further resistance. CDOC Emergency Support Center was contacted and updated. CDOC Youth Offender Services and Pueblo Minimum Center advised Emergency Support Center that they could have 45 segregation beds available if needed. They also had extra DTR radios available if needed. CTU staff Doug Armstrong advised Emergency Support Center that two buses, 1 high risk van, 7 staff and 5 electronic restraining devices were in route to CCCF from Canon City. CCCF Officers called for assistance with injured inmates. CCCF clinical staff left the Administration Area where they had been waiting for approximately 2 hours. CDOC Clinical Administrator Kellie McRae assumed CCCF clinical staff were proceeding to assist the officers requesting assistance with injured inmates. Ms. McRae learned later that CCCF clinical staff did not assist the officers. Initially, CCCF nurses would not go to the yard to assist a severely injured inmate. Combined SORT and ERT members began securing the remainder of the inmates in East and West yards, 3C and 3B. CDOC CSP and CCF Warden Larry Reid notified Emergency Support Center that 54 administrative segregation beds were available and CSP/CCF ERT was on stand-by to respond to CCCF, and Command Center was activated at CSP/CCF. The Crowley County coroner was notified of the riot situation. CCCF Unit 1 staff reported an inmate was down and fires in Units 1, 2 and 3 were still burning. Unit 3 fires were nearly extinguished. Unit 4 fires had been extinguished completely. 32 CDOC Executive Director Joe Ortiz, Director of Administration and Finance, L. D. Hay, and Director of Business Technologies, Paul Lewin, arrived at CCCF and were briefed in the Command Center. “G” Building staff reported secure. 12:30 - 1:00 AM CDOC SCCF and TCF Warden Ron Leyba notified Emergency Support Center that 16 Pueblo Complex ERT members had been deployed to CCCF along with 9 TCF ERT, and 1 canine. YOS/PMC had also sent 10 DTR radios and 15 batteries. CDOC Director of Prisons Mr. Renfrow ordered two buses capable of holding 50+ inmates to CCCF. The CCCF visitation room was designated as a temporary staging for CDOC staff and SORT. CDOC SORT members entered Unit 1, A-Pod preceded by chemical agents and met with little resistance. Unit 1 was secured without incident. G Building was then secured by CDOC SORT. SORT members began to sweep the program buildings for inmates. Involved offenders were detained inside the library area and the dining hall. CDOC SORT continued to clear the remainder of the buildings and surrounding areas. The Washington State DOC Executive Director was contacted and updated on the situation. Combined SORT members located a severely injured inmate and medical staff responded immediately to the scene. The East yard was secured. The Pueblo Complex ERT team was on-site at CCCF and CDOC Emergency Support Center was contacted with an update. 1:00 - 1:30 AM CCA Josh Brown contacted CDOC Emergency Support Center and spoke with Commander Bill Zalman. He advised Mr. Zalman of anticipated movement of Washington and Wyoming inmates to other CCA facilities. PPMU Chief Mike Arellano advised the CDOC Emergency Support Center that there were several inmate injuries. A CCCF nurse asked CDOC Clinical Administrator Kellie McRae if she, Ms. McRae, would 33 assist their medical staff in the yard with injured inmates. Ms. McRae agreed and proceeded into the yard with one CCCF nurse and followed CDOC Officers and the SORT Team members attempting to locate, triage and treat severely injured inmates. They found one inmate severely injured. Flight for Life was requested. Training Academy Director Ross Kimbrell and Jere Chaddick arrived at CCCF, inventoried all equipment on site and advised CDOC SORT member Jim Moore who relayed the information to the CDOC SORT Commander. Mr. Kimbrell and Ms. Chaddick notified Mr. Zalman at the Emergency Support Center of their arrival, delivery and securing of equipment. YOS dayshift staff were contacted and directed to report to the facility at 2:00 a.m. to begin working 12 hour shifts. The CDOC Emergency Support Center received information that the situation at CCCF was calming down and coming under control. The Pueblo Complex ERT made contact with the CDOC SORT Commander and received orders to bring only less lethal rounds into CCCF. CDOC SORT reported Unit 3 fires were extinguished. The Pueblo Complex ERT assisted combined SORT in securing Unit 4 and ensured that all inmates were placed in secure cells. The doors in some of the cells were inoperable due to damage caused by rioting inmates hitting those cell doors with weights and weight bars. CDOC SORT reported Unit 3 was secured. Flight for Life took a severely injured inmate to Saint Mary Corwin Hospital in Pueblo with numerous stab wounds and scalp injuries. CDOC Public Information Officer Alison Morgan, arrived at CCCF. Combined SORT members entered Unit 4 and CDOC SORT entered Unit 6. SORT members were escorting inmates from Unit 4 to the yard area for retention. CDOC Director of Prisons, Nolin Renfrow, advised the Emergency Support Center that significant structural and property damage had occurred at CCCF and an assessment was underway. CDOC SORT Commander contacted the Emergency Support Center and stated that the CCCF facility was under staff control and order regained. 34 CDOC Limon Correctional Facility ERT arrived at CCCF. The team began preparing to enter the facility. The ERT Commander checked in with the CDOC SORT Team Leader and initial assignments were to break into two teams armed 6 with weapons and 8 to conduct retention of inmates in the yard areas. LCF ERT staff entered the facility and were further directed to the triage areas to perform security and containment while medical staff performed assessments of the offenders. Offenders were maintained sitting on the ground and agitators were removed from the area. All offenders were in flex cuffs with replacement cuffs provided when necessary. 1:30 - 2:00 AM CDOC Emergency Support Commander Bill Zalman, communicated damage assessment to the Washington State authorities. CDOC Director of Prisons, Nolin Renfrow, PPMU staff Curtis Robinette, and Director of Administration and Finance, L. D. Hay, were checking the Food Service, Medical Clinic and Library areas when they discovered the CCCF librarian along with 36 inmates, inside the CCCF library where they had been waiting throughout the entire riot. Inmates continued to be escorted by SORT members from Unit 3. CCA Senior Director Josh Brown, communicated with CDOC Emergency Support Center Bill Zalman. Director of Prisons, Mr. Renfrow, advised the Emergency Support Center that the CCCF Food Service and Medical areas are intact. The Emergency Support Center contacted Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility Warden Carl Zenon and requested preparation of 1100 lunches to be delivered to CCCF. Warden Zenon advised that his food service staff would be contacted and meals would be prepared for delivery. CDOC SORT reported that Unit 4, Pods A, B and C were in bad shape but all doors were operable. Inmates were being secured in their cells. 2:00 - 2:30 AM CDOC Director of Prisons, Mr. Renfrow contacted the Emergency Support Center regarding bed space and inmate movement. The CDOC Mobile Emergency 35 Command Center arrived at CCCF. Present were Mike Ryan, Linda Guiterrez, Tom Adamic and Molly Hamilton. A joint meeting between CDOC staff and CCCF staff was conducted. CCCF Warden Crouse indicated that options were unknown at that time. CDOC begins to make plans for restoring facility operations and moving inmates. CDOC Clinical Administrator Kellie McRae, returned to the Administration area to find CCCF Health Administrative Services and the nurses still staged in this area and not providing assistance to staff or inmates. The Pueblo Complex ERT reported building searches were completed in the Programs, Intake, Medical and Food Service areas. All CDOC staff were instructed to check in and out at the Emergency Mobile Command Center. Staging areas for the retained inmates were established combined staff began determining what Units were still operable and could be utilized to house inmate. Units 4, 6 and Administrative Segregation assessed for a total of 634 beds useable. PPMU Chief Mike Arellano approved assignment of 3 inmates per cell. YOS Major Hager and Sgt. Estrada moved 3 female offenders from remediation in C-Pod, to general population within building #101 at YOS in preparation of receiving CCCF inmates. Clinical Administrator Kellie McRae took CDOC nurses and 3 CCCF nurses out to the yard where there were 250 inmates being retained and began triage, treatment and set up anatomical stations. CCCF sent a Clinical Supervisor to “run” the triage area, however, after she made her initial assignments, she left and was not seen again until 6:00 a.m. Ms. McRae took over the triage site operations and continued to treat inmates. At that time, 7 inmates had been sent off-site for treatment. Ms. McRae and assisting medical staff, identified another inmate possibly having a heart attack and he was sent out for treatment. One of the CCCF officers told Ms. McRae that Warden Crouse and Deputy Warden Bridges were getting “pissed” because they were sending too many inmates out for treatment. The officer went on to say that Medical Staff should only be sending those inmates out that could not treated at CCCF. Lt. McKenna from AVCF, intervened and the 36 CCCF officer backed off. Assistant Director of Clinical Services Barry Pardus, contacted the CDOC Emergency Command Center and spoke with Commander Bill Zalman, to follow-up on the resource needs from Clinical Services. Three additional CDOC nurses were directed to report to CCCF. Digital Radios were delivered to IG and CDOC staff. Three CDOC transport vehicles arrived at CCCF. 2:30 - 3:00 AM CCCF Kitchen was reported secure by CDOC Sort members. CCCF Officer Griffith had a count team ready consisting of 12 staff. Portable toilets were positioned in the yards. Two ambulances and chase vehicles were leaving the facility. Digital radios were delivered to the CDOC Legislative Liaison Greco and Assistant Director of Business Technology Paul Lewin. Trinidad Correctional Facility ERT staff arrived at CCCF. CDOC Inspector General Mike Rulo, contacted Chief Investigator Alex Wold, directing staff to check the disk trail around the CCCF perimeter for possible escape attempts. The CDOC staff assisting with inmate detainment in the yards were directed to begin taking down the names of the inmates. 3:00 - 3:30 AM CDOC Lt. Perry and DOC track teams began checking the CCCF perimeter for any signs of possible escapes. CCCF Public Information Officer Lori Pinkerton was in route to Olney Springs to meet with staff families, and media were to be directed to facility for a briefing by CDOC Public Information Officer Alison Morgan and a press release was prepared. Mobile Emergency Support Center staff Mike Ryan was setting up trackers from Trinidad Correctional Facility and Tom Adamic to check disk trail. Training Academy Director Ross Kimbrell and Jere Chaddick checked in with Ms. Greco at the Emergency Mobile Command Center and Bill Zalman at Emergency Support Center. Mr. Kimbrell and Ms. Chaddick then proceeded to the CCCF facility and began communicating to the Emergency Support Center the details of the ongoing operations there. Emergency Support Center was sending four TCF staff to CCCF to meet with Investigator Matt Richardson. Emergency Support Center Lou 37 Archuleta checked in with Emergency Mobile Support Center Ms. Greco on the status of the disk trail check. CDOC Director of Finance and Administrations L.D. Hay begins checking on motel and hotel room accommodations for CDOC staff to shower and rest. YOS reports that 5 offenders from Boot Camp-remediation in C-Pod at YOS were being moved to building #109, lower south in preparation of arrival of CCCF inmates. 3:30 - 4:00 AM CDOC Emergency Support Center was advised by PPMU Chief Mike Arellano that CCCF food service staff had been sent to the kitchen for meal preparations. CDOC Pueblo Complex ERT provide non-lethal support to escort teams as well as assistance with escorts and flex cuffing of inmates in the yard. CDOC Emergency Support Center Lou Archuleta, contacted AVCF Warden Zenon and advised him that the meals previously requested from AVCF would not be needed. CDOC Public Information Officer Alison Morgan prepared to meet with Channel 9 News. One helicopter was leaving the facility. Four AVCF ERT staff were leaving the facility and checking out with Ms. Greco at the Emergency Mobile Command Center. An inmate with a seizure was sent out in an ambulance and two additional helicopters left the facility. CDOC staff Tom Adamic observed that due to ongoing construction in the area, there were too many tracks through the disk trails to determine if inmates had been there. 4:00 - 4:30 AM CDOC Public Information Officer Alison Morgan was setting up staging area for all media. The time frame for serving breakfast to CCCF inmates is 7:00 a.m. Five vehicles from the Pueblo County Tactical Rescue arrived at CCCF. The CDOC Central Transportation Unit was performing security for media on site at CCCF. Another helicopter was arriving at the facility. YOS Associate Warden Steve Rossi, contacted Bill Zalman at the Emergency Support Center to notify him of current plans at YOS to handle the incoming inmates from CCCF. YOS staff began IDO intake cell shakedown in preparation 38 for CCCF inmates. Emergency Support Center had identified 138 beds available in other private facilities, and 299 in state facilities. CDOC recommends Wyoming offenders be sent to Kit Carson Correctional Center. An ambulance with a chase vehicle leaves the facility. Emergency Mobile Command Center staff Mike Ryan contacts CCCF to advise that anyone entering or leaving the facility grounds must check in with EMCC. CDOC Chief Investigator Alex Wold reported to Cherrie Greco that 2 CDOC nurses were reporting to CCCF. 4:30 - 5:00 AM CDOC Emergency Support Center was contacted by Training Academy staff Jere Chaddick with an update on inmate injuries at CCCF. Five (5) additional CDOC nurses and two (2) Health Services Administrative staff arrived at CCCF. A total of 10 nurses and 3 Health Service Administrators were on site. In addition, a Physician’s Assistant from AVCF arrived along with a Nurse Practitioner from SCCF. CDOC clinical staff cleared the CCCF East yard of 250 inmates. They proceeded to the West yard where three (3) CCCF nurses were present and had been doing triage for approximately 15 minutes. A CCCF nurse stated to Clinical Administrator Kellie McRae that anatomicals needed to be done. Ms. McRae and 6 CDOC nurses set up to begin doing the anatomicals. Thirty (30) minutes later, the CCCF nurses left the yard without assisting the CDOC nurses with anatomicals. CBI Investigations staff arrives at CCCF. Pueblo Complex ERT maintained perimeter around inmates detained in the yard areas. A nurse from Fort Lyon Correctional Facility arrived at CCCF. CBI canine were proceeding to the front entrance at CCCF. PPMU Monitor Pritts received a call from Deb Ahlin, PPMU Intelligence Specialist, stating that PPMU Chief Mike Arellano wanted John Bongirno and Terry Flanagan dispatched to CCCF. Mr. Bongirno was contacted at his home and directed to contact Flanagan. Both PPMU staff were then directed to respond to CCCF immediately. YOS staff contacted the CDOC Emergency Support Center stating that 45 bedrolls and hygiene kits were prepared and available for CCCF inmate’s upon their arrival at YOS. A 39 CCCF Investigator arrived at the CDOC Emergency Mobile Command Center for instructions or to provide assistance. Another ambulance and chase vehicle were leaving CCCF. 5:00 - 5:30 AM CDOC San Carlos Correctional Facility and Trinidad Correctional Facility Warden Ron Leyba, checked in with Emergency Support Center for an update. The CDOC SORT Commander reported the last offender was removed from his cell and taken to the yard for containment. SORT members continued to assist with the control of the offenders throughout the morning and medical staff assisted the offenders while they accessed the restroom and were provided a breakfast meal. CCCF day shift staff began to report to work. CDOC LCF ERT staff report that all offenders had been checked by medical and were moved to the basketball court in the recreation yard. Flex cuffs were removed and offenders were cuffed in front. Staff reported an attempt to get an inmate count was conducted, but did not know if it ever cleared. LCF ERT staff noticed that more CCCF offenders were being brought out of Units 3 & 4, indicating that these Units were never completely cleared. PPMU Chief Mike Arellano advised ESC that there was damage to Unit 6 and that several windows and doors were broken. Units 1 and 2 were unusable, however, CCCF Warden Crouse had recommended that inmates be returned to these Units and that CCA Corporate Office would deploy 35 to 40 staff to assist with inmate management. Currently, meals for inmates were being prepared and inmate count had not yet been completed. YOS reports STU moves for both outgoing and incoming inmates have been cancelled. YOS Major Hager had requested 30 pillow cases from PMC as the YOS laundry had only 15 on hand. CDOC CSP and CCF Warden Larry Reid checked in with Emergency Support Center for an update on the CCCF situation. Caroline Sutherland checked in with the Emergency Support Center and advised that more nursing staff should arrive shortly at CCCF. ERT and CDOC SORT staff were preparing to 40 feed inmates detained in the yard areas. Limon Correctional Facility Warden Estep contacted the Emergency Support Center for an update on the CCCF situation. 5:30 - 6:00 AM CDOC Assistant Director of Clinical Services Barry Pardus, checked in with the Emergency Support Center for an update of the CCCF situation. Emergency Mobile Command Center redeployed the Trinidad Correctional Facility ERT staff to search for signs of escape on the CCCF perimeter. No signs found. PPMU Chief Michael Arellano advised the Emergency Support Center that CCCF inmate count cannot be cleared; they are off by 8 inmates and a recount was in progress. YOS and PMC facilities were functioning at normal operations. A possible need for Trauma Counselors was discussed by CDOC and CCCF staff. CDOC staff Daryl Vigil checked in with Emergency Support Center and movement planning of CCCF inmates was beginning. CDOC Crime Analyst Brandon Davis checked in with Emergency Support Center. PPMU Monitor Pritts received contact from Intelligence Specialist Deb Ahlin stating Chief Arellano requested Clinical Manager Brad Kinney and Dana Bustos, Mental Health Program Specialist to respond to CCCF. Mr. Kinney and Ms. Bustos had already been notified and were in route to CCCF. Trinidad Correctional Facility ERT continue checking disk trails around CCCF perimeter. CDOC Training Academy Director Kimbrell and Jere Chaddick transferred selected equipment to the SORT vehicle and departed CCCF. 6:00 - 6:30 AM PPMU Chief Mike Arellano, advised Emergency Support Center that the recount from 5:35 has not begun. Director of Prisons Nolin Renfrow advised Emergency Support Center that CCCF Unit 3 could be used to assign inmates. Preliminary reports and interviews conducted with inmates indicated that the entire incident may have been due to an improper use of force by CCCF staff. Clinical Services Administrator Brad Kinney, contacted CCCF Health 41 Services Administrator Del LeCount, to determine quantities of medical supplies and medication on hand at CCCF. Ms. LeCount reported inadequate supplies although Fort Lyon Correctional Facility and Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility had provided additional medical supplies. Additional supplies would be needed. Mr. Kinney indicated he would stop in route at the Pueblo Pharmacy to obtain the needed supplies. PPMU Chief Mike Arellano, advised Emergency Support Center that a medical report of inmate injuries was being faxed to them. All ambulances had been cleared to leave the facility. CCCF staff indicated counting of inmates would resume during feeding. CDOC CTU staff Rich Martinez advised the Emergency Support Center that relief for the Emergency Mobile Command Center would occur at 2:00 p.m. 6:30 - 7:00 AM CDOC Emergency Support Center notified SCCF that the Gym space at SCCF would not be needed for housing inmates. CDOC Clinical staff reported that 75% of inmate anatomicals were completed. CCCF Chief Selman wants strip searches performed on all inmates to reveal possible injuries unreported. PPMU staff Terry Flanagan and John Bongirno arrived on grounds at CCCF. Mr. Bongirno was assigned as logistics support in the Administration Area and Mr. Flanagan was assigned to logistical support for Brad Kinney and the SORT and ERT teams. The Pueblo Complex ERT staff assisted in reapplying flex cuffs cuffing inmates in the front following restroom breaks in the yard areas. YOS CO Garcia had contacted Swing Shift Staff informing them to arrive at YOS facility at 10:00 a.m. to begin their 12 hour shift. Limon Correctional Facility ERT staff report they began to rotate the CCCF inmates for hydration and rest. Clinical Services Administrator Brad Kinney reported the Pueblo Pharmacy did not open until 7:00 a.m. He had obtained needed medical supplies and was in route to CCCF. 7:00 - 7:30 AM CDOC Emergency Support Center notified YOS Associate Warden Steve Rossi, that 45 beds at YOS would be needed immediately. YOS staff began Unit #104 shakedown in 42 preparation of inmates moving from YOS A & B Pods IDO-STU. PPMU staff Terry Flanagan reported to the yard area and John Bongirno checked in with Incident Command Center, DOC staff and CCCF staff. After initial briefing, Mr. Bongirno and Ms. Ahlin preceded to the yard areas where offenders were staged and flex cuffed. The inmates were being fed sack breakfasts. Inspections were conducted to assess the damages inflicted on housing Units, the Greenhouse and fences. Mr. Bongirno provided bottled water to staff positioned on the roof of the Administration Building. YOS food service received notification of the 45 CCCF inmates arriving. 7:30 - 8:00 AM CDOC Emergency Support Center indicated a conference call between CDOC Director of Prisons Nolin Renfrow, CCCF Warden Crouse, stating that 138 Wyoming inmates from CCCF would be moved to the 3 other private CCA facilities in Colorado. CDOC Legislative Liaison Cherrie Greco allowed entry of a Shamrock Food Truck onto CCCF grounds. CDOC Trinidad Correctional Facility requested to move 10 CCCF inmates to that facility. All CCCF inmates had been fed breakfast. All inmates not detained in the yard areas had been moved into temporary housing assignment until repairs could be completed to the damaged Units. YOS Lt. Cordova contacted YOS Command Center stating that the Pueblo Campus had 16 ERT members at CCCF. All were issued less lethal weapons and none were involved in any use of force incidents at that time. Unit #104 had been searched and cleared per Capt. Romero. Major Hager contacted Physical Plant Manager Dave Zupan, to inform him that the chiller in Unit #104 required repairs in order to receive CCCF inmates, water fountains needed repaired and other accommodations would be necessary to maintain order and control of arriving CCCF inmates. Following administrative roll call, YOS graveyard shift would be released to return at their regularly scheduled time of 10:00 p.m. 43 8:00 - 8:30 AM CDOC Clinical Administrator Brad Kinney, Debra Kinney and Dana Bustos arrived and reported to the medical Department to assist in preparing transportation related information, medications and preparing offender files for transport. Returning to the CCCF Administration Area, PPMU staff John Bongirno coordinated housing reservations with local motels and hotels for DOC Executive staff and SORT members. Plans were being made to move a number of Colorado offenders and Wyoming offenders out of CCCF. Offender Services coordinates the move lists with PPMU staff John Bongirno and Terry Flanagan, and CCCF staff. Teams would be established to locate and escort offenders scheduled to move to the CCCF Intake area. Mr. Flanagan coordinated activities in the Intake area. CCCF Case Managers and Mr. Bongirno established teams, located the offenders scheduled to move and escort them to Intake. Director of Community and Parole Jeaneene Miller, contacted YOS Associate Warden Steve Rossi and was informed of the pending YOS plans to receive 45 CCCF Inmates. Graveyard staff was briefed on the CCCF inmate arrival. CDOC Emergency Support Center notified Park County authorities that 50 beds would be needed to move CCCF inmate into and CDOC will deploy staff to CCCF to assist with movement. A list of inmates to be transferred from CCCF to YOS was transmitted on DCIS. 8:30 - 9:00 AM CDOC Emergency Support Center Lou Archuleta spoke with Curtis Robinette who was directed to advise the inmates moving to Park County and YOS that this was not a regressive move. Assistant Director of Clinical Services Barry Pardus and Chris Petrozzi, Regional Health Services Administrator, arrived at CCCF. Dana Bustos and Brad Kinney preceded to CCCF Medical and meet with Hilbert Navarro and Dan Plagge, mental health providers at CCCF. They discussed debriefing the staff and inmates and provided support to facility staff. Ms. Bustos interviewed an inmate and provided his name to Investigator Dave Smith. The Pueblo Complex ERT 44 assisted in feeding and maintaining inmates in the yard areas. Emergency Support Center began the process of notifying the next of kin of injured inmates. YOS reported moving 30 inmates from STU to BLDG. #104 at YOS to accommodate the CCCF inmate arrivals. Medical staff reported working with CCCF, AVCF and FLCF staff to ensure triage and coordinate transfer of offenders to other facilities. Updates were maintained with PPMU staff, Offender Services and others. Medical records, documentation, medications, were packaged and coordinated with transport trips with offenders. All CCCF offenders, with the exception of one seriously injured inmate, were returned to the facility. YOS reported the list of 45 CCCF inmates and time of arrival at YOS were received via DCIS message. Offender Services staff Darryl Vigil contacted YOS ESC stating CCCF inmates arriving at YOS would not have working files because they were destroyed by fire at CCCF. However these inmates were not involved in the disturbance. YOS Captain Ellis contacted Lt. Williams for confirmation of list of inmates and asked that QT files be accessed for information on incoming inmates. YOS reported that 30 inmates from A & B Pods were moved to Unit #104 to accommodate incoming CCCF inmate bed space needs. Major Hagar directed Sgt. Cordova to prepare Intake for incoming CCCF Inmates. Video equipment was prepared and medical staff were contacted to provide anatomical exams of all incoming inmates. 9:00 - 9:30 AM CDOC CSP & CCF Warden Larry Reid contacted Emergency Support Center stating that the CSP/CCF Command Center was deactivating and he would be available by pager if needed. Limon Correctional Facility ERT staff reported that CCCF offenders were separated by Unit and were given a sack meal. Some inmates were returned to Units 3 and 4 after clean up measures were completed. The remaining inmates were escorted to the West yard and contained with additional CCCF inmates. YOS Major Hagar contacted San Carlos Correctional Facility requesting a nurse be provided to assist with the 45 intake process of CCCF inmates upon their arrival. Leonard Vigil contacted Captain Romero at YOS stating that inmate count still had not cleared at CCCF and no inmates would be moved until count was cleared. Mr. Vigil requested a call at 30 minute intervals to determine count progress. Assistant Director of Parole and Community Tim Hand, contacted YOS Associate Warden Steve Rossi to confirm a parole officer in route to YOS to pick up three Phase III inmates. YOS Lt. Williams contacted YOS Command Center to state there was 1 inmate in D-Pod in remediation status and would be left there. YOS Captain Ellis contacted Command Center to determine status of incoming CCCF inmates and would proceed counting inmates in A and B Pod prior to their move to Unit #104. Lt. Reaux contacted Command Center stating staff were proceeding to IDO to retrieve count sheets. Staff would then proceed to Visiting for briefing and remain until there until deployed. 9:30 - 10:00 AM CDOC Emergency Support Center received an update from PPMU Chief Mike Arellano who was sending an updated medical list. Trinidad Correctional Facility ERT Commander Winden contacted the CDOC SORT Commander and it was determined that the TCF mobile armory and half of the TCF ERT staff would return to TCF. YOS Major Hager and Lt. Torrez brief swing shift staff and deploy them to CCCF. LCF ERT staff escort CCCF inmates to the newly constructed Units. Those inmates were secured in cells. CCCF Command Center was advised that Washington State officials had arrived at CCCF. The Colorado Governors office contacted the Emergency Support Center with notification that the Governor would visit CCCF. Emergency Support Center directed CTU staff to stop media security. YOS ERT Lt. Cordova contacted YOS Command Center stating 50-60 inmates remained in the yard at CCCF and asked the information be passed to Major Lynn at SCCF. 10:00 – 11:00 AM TCF Lt. Stickler and 4 TCF ERT staff departed CCCF to return to TCF. Three TCF ERT staff remained to transport 8 offenders from CCCF to TCF. YOS Command Center 46 received message from Laurie Gephart, DOC Accounting Technician, directing all involved staff to track staff hours and expenses incurred during the CCCF disturbance and response by CDOC. YOS Captain Machin contacted the YOS Command Center with list of swing shift staff on duty assignments and where they were deployed. CDOC Emergency Support Center contacted Larry Reid, CSP/CCF Warden, regarding the need to move 8 CCCF inmates to CSP. YOS Major Hagar directed staff to begin working on 12 hour staffing pattern schedule to operate YOS. Pueblo Complex ERT escorted CCCF inmates to Units and assist with feeding process. 11:00 - 12:00 PM CTU buses were en route to pick up CCCF inmates for transport. CDOC ERT and SORT staff were released from facility after debriefing. YOS Staff contacted Leonard Vigil to verify CCCF inmates were in route. CCCF count had not cleared and no movement would occur until count cleared. TCF ERT staff would be transporting the inmates being assigned to the Trinidad Correctional Facility. Emergency Mobile Support Center was sending fresh radio batteries into facility to CDOC staff. YOS Captain Ellis notified Commander Center that STU inmates had been fed and moved to Unit #104. STU Unit was being prepared for arrival of CCCF Inmates. PPMU Chief Mike Arellano advises Emergency Support Center that preparations for transport process have begun. A debrief was conducted at CCCF Visiting area administered by L. D. Hay, Director of Administration and Finance, Mike Rulo, Inspector General, and the CDOC SORT Commander. All CDOC ERT teams were released, with the exception of the Fort Lyon Correctional Facility team, which remained on site and continued to assist with movement of offenders to interviews conducted with CDOC CID staff. The Pueblo Complex ERT was in route back to SCCF. 12:00 – 1:00 PM Detained CCCF offenders were provided a lunch meal, and systematically, one small group at a time, began to be returned to cleaned and restored living units. One half of 47 the SORT members were relieved to return to their homes, while the other half remained at CCCF to assist with the clean up operations. YOS Captain Ellis contacted Command Center stating A and B Pods were ready for CCCF inmate arrivals. YOS Command Center contacted Leonard Vigil to check status of CCCF inmate transport and informed that CCCF Count still had not cleared. YOS Management Team arrived at YOS Command Center. 12:30 - 1:00 PM CDOC CTCF Associate Warden Kevin Milyard contacted Emergency Support Center to inform them that CTCF could accept 10 inmates. Pueblo Complex ERT secured weapons, ammunition and equipment upon their return to SCCF and debriefed. Fremont Correctional Facility Associate Warden Bobby Allen contacted the Emergency Support Center to requested FCF Command Center be permitted to stand down. Request was approved. YOS Associate Warden Steve Rossi briefed Assistant Director Tim Hand of current situation at YOS. The YOS LAN Coordinator informed Command Center that two computers were installed and operational in Building #104 at YOS. PPMU Chief Mike Arellano checked in with the Emergency Support Center stating the movement process was going very slowly. Leonard Vigil contacted YOS Command Center stating that 45 CCCF inmates would be arriving at YOS at approximately 3:00 p.m. YOS Captain Ellis contacted SCCF to ensure a Medical Nurse reported to YOS medical at 2:30 p.m. to assist with the arrival of CCCF Inmates. Communications contacted YOS Command Center stating that telephones in Unit #104 were disabled. Telephone in A and B Pods were activated. 1:00 – 2:00 PM CCA Public Information Officer Steve Owen arrived at CCCF. Pueblo Complex ERT Team was released to recover and get personal gear ready. TCF ERT staff were notified that CCCF inmates assigned to move to TCF were staged in Intake and ready to transport. TCF ERT staff departed CCCF Intake with 8 inmates assigned to TCF. It is unclear if CCCF inmate count had been cleared. 48 CDOC Emergency Support Center advised CTCF that the 10 beds at that facility would not be needed. Director of Parole and Community Jeaneene Miller contacted the YOS Command Center to receive an update on CCCF riot situation. Ann Diggs, Regional Health Services Administrator, contacted Command Center stating that nurses would be deployed from Canon Area Facilities to assist with the intake process of the 45 CCCF Inmates arriving at YOS. All of the inmates previously transported out of CCCF for medical care have been returned to the facility except for the seriously injured inmate taken by Flight for Life. 2:00 – 3:00 PM CDOC Emergency Support Center contacted CCCF Warden Crouse and requested a direct line for contact to discuss a press conference with Governor Owens and CDOC Executive Director Joe Ortiz. Governor Owens arrived at CCCF for a press conference. Emergency Mobile Command Center staff Martinez, Bennett, and Brady reported for duty and relieved MECC staff. Leonard Vigil contacted the YOS Command Center stating the departure time of the 45 CCCF Inmates was delayed. Departure was anticipated at 3:00 p.m. YOS Associate Warden Steve Rossi, contacted the Shift Commander directing all day shift staff to report to Visiting Room to receive amended schedules for the next day. Staff contacted the YOS Command Center stating Unit #113 would be short-staffed with the departure of the Day Shift Staff. Additional staff were deployed to ensure minimum staffing was achieved. Leonard Vigil contacted YOS Command Center stating departure time of the 45 CCCF Inmates was expected at 3:45 p.m. CTU staff Rich Martinez, relief for mobile command, had arrived. TCF ERT staff arrived at TCF with the 8 CCCF inmates who were taken to visiting for processing and urinalysis. CTU began transporting 45 Colorado offenders to YOS. PPMU Chief Mike Arellano checked in; packing of inmates going slowly. Park County Jail arrived on grounds at CCCF to pick up 57 DOC offenders. 49 3:00 - 4:00 PM CDOC CTU began transporting 8 Colorado offenders to CSP. CCCF Incident Commander was not allowing offenders to move off grounds until count clears. SORT members were deployed to CCCF Intake area to assist CTU with transport of CCCF offenders to other locations. SORT members were advised that Governor Owens had arrived to tour the facility and SORT members were deployed to provide protection for Governor Owens during his walk through at CCCF. CSP/CCF, and CTCF ERT members arrived to relieve FLCF ERT. CCF and CSP ERT arrived at CCCF to assist with transport and operations. Governor Owens left CCCF. Leonard Vigil contacted YOS Command Center stating CTU transport would arrive at YOS in approximately 15 minutes. YOS Management Team report to Intake to observe Intake process of CCCF inmates. 45 CCCF inmates arrived at YOS and proceeded into A, B, and C Pods of IDO Building number #104 Business Technology staff Molly Hamilton relieved by Gary Cassio who would remain on site to provide BT support to the Emergency Mobile Command Center. Three CSP ERT members transported 8 offenders to CSP. Remainder of ERT members stayed at CCCF to provide assistance. PPMU Chief Mike Arellano checked in with Emergency Support Center and would be leaving CCCF at 4:00 p.m. PPMU staff Terry Flanagan would be taking over. Inspector General’s staff were at the facility throughout the day but were unable to conduct any inmate interviews because CCCF staff were unavailable to escort the inmates. 4:00 - 5:00 PM All CDOC SORT members were present at CCCF and a team debrief was conducted. A schedule of SORT member presence and assignments at CCCF was passed out to all members, providing coverage and assistance through July 29th, 2004. CTU staff Doug Armstrong contacted the Emergency Support Center and indicated 50 that bus 5 would return to CCCF to pick up inmates to transport to Park County. Estimated time of arrival at CCCF is 5:30 p.m. Command Center at YOS was contacted to determine if college classes or library privileges would occur that evening at YOS. The Shift Commander stated notification would be made upon his return to the YOS Command Center. The CDOC Emergency Support Center was deactivated. The Pueblo Complex Command Center was deactivated. The YOS Command Center was contacted by Prison Operations Manager Lou Archuleta stating that the Emergency Support Center at Headquarters was standing down and he would be available by pager if necessary. YOS-Management Team returning to Command Center. Director of Parole and Community Jeaneene Miller, contacted YOS Command Center for an update on the arrival of CCCF inmates. Associate Warden Rossi and Major Hagar stated that the intake process occurred smoothly with no incidents. A portion of CDOC nurses are relieved by FLCF nurses. CDOC nurses left CCCF. Inmate count at CCCF had not cleared due to offenders being located in cells they were not assigned to and they were triple bunked. Evening CCCF Incident Manager Deputy Warden Miller, ordered a numbers count to facilitate expediency in clearing the inmate count. No moves were allowed. Offender transport staff from CTU, Park County Jail, KCCC and BCCF were held up waiting hours for count to clear. Buses were staged on grounds awaiting offenders. The three CCA (ERT) SORT teams were briefed and staged to locate and escort offenders to Intake for the moves. All three teams were from CCA facilities in other states, Arizona, Tennessee, and Florida. They had just arrived and were not familiar with the facility layout making count more difficult. PPMU staff Dana Bustos departed CCCF for Colorado Springs office. 51 5:00 - 6:00 PM CCA Public Information Officer Steve Owens conducted a press conference at facility. PPMU Chief Mike Arellano turned in his assigned radio to the Emergency Mobile Command Center and would be off grounds for the night. PPMU staff Terry Flanagan would be the liaison between CCCF and Mobile Command. CCCF staff were conducting an offender and staff accountability. CDOC staff were unsure as to what time it began and if it had cleared. 6:00 - 7:00 PM All evidence gathered by CDOC Inspector General’s staff would be stored at AVCF in the property area. All IG staff were off grounds for the evening and would report again at CCCF in the morning. CDOC Investigator Jay Kirby was the only IG staff remaining on grounds. Any further information would be reported to CDOC Investigator Dave Smith by pager. Dave Smith advised the CCF/CSP ERT Commander to walk the CCCF perimeter looking for signs of bloody clothing, take pictures if possible, and write a report. Any items found would be placed in individual bags and identified insuring to note the location they were found. CDOC SORT members reported that they would end their shift as of 10:00 p.m. unless Mr. Renfrow advised them otherwise. All CDOC ERT teams would no longer be needed at CCCF. 7:00 - 8:00 PM CCF/CSP ERT reported to the CCCF Visiting area to assist in the offender movement process and transports out of the facility. Offenders were currently being housed in Unit 3 and 4 pending movements. The Mobile Emergency Command Center satellite dish was broken due to wind gusts that caused the awning to hit the arm. The dish was temporarily repaired. 9:00 – 10:00 PM After count clears, CCA (ERT) SORT Teams located and escorted offenders to Intake. PPMU Staff Terry Flanagan coordinated the Intake activities to timely process offenders. With the limited number of CCCF staff on 52 grounds, PPMU staff John Bongirno directed the SORT Teams to the specific Units and cell houses and guided the SORT escorts around the Programs Building to Intake. Mr. Bongirno escorted a SORT member to Medical for treatment of a laceration. 10:00 - 11:00 PM The Crowley County Sheriff’s Department departed CCCF. Perimeter security is in place and Sheriff’s Office staff would not be providing assistance to the facility throughout the evening. The Crowley Fire Department reported to the CCCF facility to contain a flare up that occurred in the facility. They would stand by pending offender movement completion. The Mobile Command Center generator was shut down in order to check the oil and add fuel. Systems were shut down until the generator service was completed. The system restarted at EMCC with no problems noted. The Crowley Fire Department contained the flare up and had departed the facility. 11:00 - 12:00 PM The CCA Tennessee SORT staff arrived on site at CCCF July 22, 2004 12:00 - 1:00 AM Park County departed CCCF with 13 offenders 1:00 - 2:00 AM CDOC CTU and Park County Jail staff were transporting 57 offenders to the Park County Jail. Estimated time of arrival at Park County is 4:30 p.m. ERT and SORT were debriefed and would be off grounds for the remainder of the evening. SORT would leave 2 staff at the facility on 7-22-04. SORT Member contacted CSP Master Control to clear staff from 24 hours of duty since the beginning of the disturbance at CCCF. CTU staff transported 44 CCCF offenders to Park County. 4:30 – 5:00AM Two private charter buses with 76 CCCF offenders departed to Kit Carson Correctional Facility and 40 offenders were transported to Bent County Correctional Facility. 53 6:30 - 7:00 AM Three (3) CDOC nurses arrived with a Health Services Administrator at the request of CCCF medical, to complete anatomicals. When the nurses arrived, they find out that CCCF medical staff wanted them to do medication lines. CDOC nurses were not comfortable with performing this function and, after consultation with Headquarters Medical staff, it was determined that their mission at CCCF was complete. PPMU Chief Arellano reported for duty at CCCF. CTU staff Baum, Guiterrez, and Thomas reported for duty in the Emergency Mobile Command Center and relieved CDOC staff Martinez, Bennett, and Brady. Two CDOC SORT members reported for duty. 7:00 - 7:30 AM PPMU Chief Michael Arellano advised Emergency Mobile Command Center to allow construction workers into CCCF, however, they were allowed only to work outside the perimeter of CCCF. 7:30 - 8:00 AM A King Soopers delivery truck arrived to deliver bread to CCCF. Mr. Arellano advised staff to send the delivery truck to the CCCF Back Gate. Investigators Dave Smith, Jay Kirby and Danny Lake reported for duty at CCCF. 12:00 to 12:30 PM Business Technologies staff Richard Cochran, arrived at EMCC. 1:30 to 2:00 PM Business Technologies staff Molly Hamilton is leaving CCCF with Legislative Liaison Cherrie Greco. 3:00 to 3:30 PM Emergency Mobile Command Center was deactivated. 5:30 to 6:00 PM Inmate count cleared at CCCF. 7:30 PM PPMU staff John Bongirno and Terry Flanagan were relieving Curtis Robinette and Michael Arellano at CCCF. SORT members reported that some ERT members assigned to do shakedowns in the evening of 7-21-04 had found several homemade knives secreted in the offender 54 mattresses. This information was forwarded to CCCF Associate Warden Bridges and Acting Incident Manager Mike Miller. July 23, 2004 8:00 AM PPMU Staff Terry Flanagan and John Bongirno departed CCCF. 8:34 PM Park County Jail contacted to follow up on status of the Colorado offenders assigned to that facility. Sergeant Crawford stated that everything went well with the intake process. 9:49 PM CCA Kit Carson Correctional Center contacted on the status of the 76 Wyoming offenders moved to that facility. Staff indicated that a few of the offenders were mouthy during the trip, but all offenders were processed into the facility. Facility had total of 6 empty beds, three in segregation and three in general population. 9:54 PM CCA Bent County Correctional Facility contacted on the status of the 40 Wyoming offenders moved to that facility. Staff report shift briefing included mention of Wyoming offenders move with no incident. July 24, 2004 5:00 PM PPMU staff John Bongirno attended the Incident Management Team Leader Changeover Briefing at CCCF. 8:20 PM CCCF Warden Crouse requested CDOC’s approval of moving offenders from triple bunking on the floor to other cells. John Bongirno contacted PPMU Chief Mike Arellano, who authorized the moves. 8:50 PM CCCF Warden Crouse requested John Bongirno’s signature on the authorization of the memo stating no visiting would occur through the weekend. According to Warden Crouse, Mike Arellano approved the memo verbally. 55 Use of Force Rioting inmates actively resisted the efforts of Emergency Response Teams. From various locations in the facility, inmates threw rocks and burning debris at officers and used metal lockers and file cabinets as protective shields for advancing towards officers. They continued to feed fires. The Office of the Inspector General had determined that reasonable force was used to bring the inmate population back into compliance and to regain control of the institution. In all, 19 inmates were treated for serious injuries and no staff injuries were reported. Numerous other inmates were treated for less severe injuries. DOC’s Special Operations Response Teams (SORT) and various DOC Emergency Response Teams (ERT) expended the following types and amounts of munitions: YOS ERT: Shotguns Rounds of RP23 (non-lethal) Rounds of Slugs Rounds of buck shot OC grenades Smoke grenades Stingball grenades ISPRA-JET 5 50 50 100 10 2 12 AVCF ERT: Flex cuffs 37 mm .60 caliber rubber rounds Sting Ball #9594 CS continuous discharge grenade 12 gauge 00 rubber pellet rounds 1000 sets 12 2 2 50 CDOC SORT: 37mm Rubber Pellet Rounds 12 Sting Ball Grenades 2 CN Continuous Discharge Grenades 2 12 Gauge High Velocity Rubber Pellet Rounds 170 Liters of OC for ISPRA jet use 2 Flex Cuffs 1100 Canine Unit was utilized for crowd control and to clear buildings 56 The Crowley County Correctional Facility reports having used the following types and amounts of munitions: 00 Buckshot 7 ½ Birdshot 12 gauge HV Rubber Pellets 12 gauge Bean Bag CS Triple Chaser 37mm Bean Bag rounds 60 Cal Stinger 37mm Foam Baton rounds MK-4 Pepper Spray 10% MK-4 Pepper Fogger 5.5% Flex Cuffs 20 rounds 143 rounds 66 6 4 10 8 3 11 2 1000 Observations A number of observations were made during the incident by CDOC staff: • • • • • • • • • • • • Lack of front entry security Doors propped open at times No visible evidence of Emergency Plan in use Line staff not mobilized; confusion regarding shift change; dependent upon CDOC backup Inmates escorted without restraints and placed into ambulances unrestrained; more than one inmate being transported in same ambulance Difficulty in accounting for tools and keys Staff and inmate accountability uncertain; management was not aware that a librarian was missing and, in fact, was isolated in the library with approximately 37 inmates. Wooden cell doors were set on fire by rioting inmates Porcelain fixtures were broken and pieces used as weapons Segregation and control center doors were defeated Case management files accessed in living units and compromised by inmates Lack of training for hazardous materials/blood spill clean up 57 • • • • • • • • • • • CDOC nursing staff brought in to provide triage care; only one Crowley medical staff on site until daybreak. Delay in providing food service Chemical agents not deployed in a timely manner by Crowley staff. Incident commander dependent upon direction from corporate office Critical Incident debriefing of staff by mental health providers delayed Tools belts taken from civilian electrical contractors by inmates Status and location of two religious volunteers uncertain Inadequate staff training to operate locking mechanisms on living unit control center escape hatches No chemical agents in housing unit control centers available for use to deter inmates CCCF SORT team ordered to stand down until CDOC’s SORT team arrived on scene Inexperienced staff issuing weapons and munitions from armory; CCCF armorer deployed to the roof Office of the Inspector General On July 20, 2004, at 9:00 P.M., Mike Rulo, Inspector General, Chief Investigator Alex Wold, and four investigators, along with four K-9 teams, all from the Colorado Department of Corrections, responded to the Crowley County Correctional Facility in Olney Springs. This response occurred as a result of a reported inmate uprising/riot at CCCF. Initial reports indicated that the facility was at risk of being overrun by rioting inmates. Per CRS 17103.8, the Office of the Inspector General is the appropriate law enforcement authority to investigate criminal matters, use of force and any contributing factors that may have caused such a disturbance. This authority extends not only to CDOC facilities, but also to privately owned and operated correctional institutions that house CDOC inmates. At approximately 9:30 P.M., investigators arrived at CCCF and confirmed that the facility’s external perimeter was being secured by the Crowley County Sheriff’s Office, Pueblo County Sheriff’s Office, Colorado State Patrol and other local law enforcement agencies. After a briefing from Brent Crouse, CCCF Warden, and PPMU staff on site, investigators determined that the entire facility was at risk of being overrun by rioting inmates. Living units, with the exception of Unit 6, had been taken over by inmates and institutional property destroyed and burned. Inmates were in 58 control of yards and had access to program areas. They destroyed and burned the Greenhouse and were threatening G-Building, a trades program area. Several other fires burned outside living units, and the Administration Building was at risk. It was reported that no inmates had breached the external security fences. Staff Accountability Investigators were advised by CCCF administration that all staff had been previously accounted for between 8:30-9:00 P.M, and that all staff had been evacuated from the yards and living units. It was later determined, however, when two CCCF officers in Unit 2 were rescued by CCCF’s SORT team members, that the staff accountability reports were incorrect. When the disturbance began, the two officers fled to an empty segregation cell and locked themselves in. Further, during the early morning hours of July 21, a staff librarian was discovered, along with 37 inmates, in the facility’s library, and she was subsequently escorted to safety. The whereabouts of these staff members was never communicated to investigators, since the facility’s administration believed all staff had been accounted for. The Onset of the Riot The investigation has revealed the incident began at approximately 7:30 P.M., after a group of inmates in the West Yard demanded an audience with the warden concerning their complaints. Inmates making the demands were confronted by the Shift Commander, a captain who denied their demands to talk with the warden, but reportedly attempted to engage the group’s leader in discussion of the demands. It was reported that the Shift Commander was unsuccessful in attempts to find a spokesman for the group, and the group became threatening towards the Shift Commander and other officers present. Staff retreated from the yard for their own safety. At the Shift Commander’s direction, a public address system announcement was made, giving an order to all inmates in the yard to disperse and return to their living units, and that the yard was closed. The inmates became unruly, started to become hostile and refused to comply with directives. At that time, the order was given for living units to lock their doors, and staff were told to prepare for an emergency evacuation of their posts. Inmates became bolder, began to damage property, incited other inmates to riot and threatened to breach living units’ security doors. Staff were then ordered to abandon their posts in the interest of safety. 59 Once officers evacuated yards and living units, inmates realized their conduct was going unchecked, and there was no officer presence to prevent them from engaging in more criminal misconduct. They became more belligerent and aggressive. The CDOC investigation has concluded that Washington inmates played a major role in instigating and initiating the riot. Reports indicate they became disruptive in retaliation for a use of force on a Washington inmate by CCCF staff earlier in the day. The investigation has further revealed that Washington inmates were the first to remove weight equipment and start utilizing dumbbells and 45 pound weight bars to damage property. A video tape observation indicates that a Washington inmate, identified as the leader of other Washington inmates, was the first to start breaking windows and pounding on the door of Living Unit 2. He instructed other inmates to break into the Segregation Unit and release the inmate earlier involved in the use of force incident. This was accomplished with weight bars being passed through the cell door’s broken window, allowing the inmate the use of the weight bar to defeat the door from within. Using this method, inmates were able to destroy additional doors and locking mechanisms in not only the segregation areas of the facilities, but throughout. Colorado and Wyoming inmates became principals in the riot when they took immediate advantage of the situation and aggressively began participating. They also destroyed equipment, furnishings and used weight equipment to break through cell doors and locks. Case Management offices were broken into and inmate files rifled, in order to identify files belonging to sex offenders and informants. These inmates were targeted in later assaults the same night. At this writing, there is no clear indication that the riot involved a dispute among Security Threat Groups (STG). If anything, it has become evident from inmate interviews and an analysis of posted STG graffiti written on walls during the riot that STG groups banded together and acted in concert with each other. The only indications of STG related incidents were the assaults on two inmates, with evidence that two Security Threat groups carried out those assaults. Damage 60 Eventually, inmates caused extensive damage to Living Units 1 and 2 with some damage to Units 3 and 4. Case management offices were compromised and inmate files accessed. Windows were broken and living unit Control Centers were breached. Inmates destroyed porcelain toilets and sinks, as well as sprinkler systems. Consequently, water lines were broken and flooding occurred. Toilet flush valves were tied down to cause continual flushing. Day Hall televisions were destroyed, as well as vending machines, clothes washers, dryers and microwave ovens. Most of these items were dragged outside, stuffed with flammable materials and set on fire. Ultimately, inmates were able to defeat Control Centers in every Living Unit. Locking mechanisms were destroyed, windows broken and electronic control panels were smashed. As Control Center staff realized that inmate access was imminent, they escaped by way of an overhead hatch. However, according to witness statements, staff were unable to secure the hatch locks behind them, thus permitting inmates to follow, gaining access to the roof. The subsequent investigation indicates that no chemicals or munitions were available to staff to defend the Control Centers against the advancing inmates. The Greenhouse was vandalized and completely burned after inmates breached a security fence behind Living Unit 1. Inmates also reached the programs building area, Building B, but were not successful in breaching the building. They did access Building G, housing the furniture shop and Habitat for Humanity, but did little damage to these structures, other than possibly removing tools. They did attempt to ignite a fire in this area, however, it was started under the sprinkling system and was quickly extinguished. Telephones From the start of the riot, until approximately 10:00 P.M., inmates used the telephones to call friends, families and members of the media. Consequently, taped recordings of phone calls have led to the identification of at least 40-60 criminal suspects and riot participants. During these calls, inmates admitted to their own participation in the uprising and implicated others. Media began calling facility administration to confirm the inmates’ reports of the riot. Inmate Assaults 61 During the destruction of Living Units 1 and 2, inmates rifled through case manager records, looking for files of other inmates considered to be police informants or those identified as sex offenders. Those inmates identified by the rioters as either informants or sex offenders were targeted for assault. Two known assaults were perpetrated by bands of roving inmates within Living Units 1 and 2. The first and most serious assault occurred when an inmate in Unit 1 was attacked by a group of inmates. The inmate was secured in his cell; however, other inmates rammed his door with weight bars and set the wooden door on fire. Once the door had been defeated, perpetrators stabbed the inmate, struck him with weight bars, beat him and threw him off the second tier of the living unit. Inmates accosted the severely injured inmate again while he lay on the first floor and struck him on the head with a microwave oven, leaving him for dead. Later, the severely injured inmate was discovered by response team members while retaking control of Living Unit 1. He was later airlifted to Pueblo for hospital treatment. The second serious assault occurred in Unit 2. Rioting inmates broke through a segregation cell, occupied by this inmate. He was dragged from the cell and beaten. Attacking inmates attempted to stab him repeatedly until the blade of the weapon was bent. The inmate was later rescued and treated by a CCCF physicians’ assistant. However, his name was omitted from the list of injured inmates who had been victims of assault, and he was subsequently moved the following day to the Park County Jail. This injured inmate reported the assault to Park County staff. During additional interviews conducted by investigators, inmates complained of injuries received from birdshot and rubber bullets, fired by officers attempting to regain control of the facility. Response to the Riot It became apparent to responding CDOC Investigators and the CDOC SORT Commander arriving on scene that a quicker and stronger response by the facility security staff at the initial onset of the riot would have limited the extent of the riot. Investigators believe that the lack of response was due to indecisive command level decision making or inadequate staffing and resources, or both. The facility’s command staff either could not or would not deal with the situation at its inception. Further, reports indicate that the 62 facility’s SORT team was told to “stand down” until Colorado’s Department of Corrections’ SORT team arrived. The facility’s emergency response team had been disbanded and was only recently reinstated, thus indicating lack of training for response to an incident of this magnitude. Once notified, CDOC staff and units responded to the site and provided assistance in a variety of ways: 1. The Emergency Support Center was activated at the CDOC Headquarters Building, Colorado Springs. Personnel provided assistance and developed a plan to move inmates from CCCF. 2. The Emergency Mobile Command Center was deployed from Canon City and remained onsite, utilized as a communications hub; staff controlled access and egress to the riot scene. 3. Escape Team personnel and K-9 Units conducted a sweep of the perimeter to ensure no inmates had escaped. K-9’s were used for additional crowd control. 4. Training Academy staff transported multiple sets of hard restraints, 2 shields and 22 cases of less lethal ammunition to CCCF. 5. The Public Information Officer established a staging area for news media outside the facility and released updated status reports over the next twenty-four hours. The PIO also arranged for a late morning press conference/briefing by the CDOC Executive Director, July 21. Preparations were coordinated for an on-site tour and press conference by Governor Bill Owens, scheduled for 2:00 P.M. the same day. 6. The Legislative Liaison provided facility escort for arriving CDOC medical staff to the triage area, communicated with the Mobile Command Center, assisted with yard supervision and responded to incoming legislative inquiries. 7. Staff from Business Technologies maintained digital radio communications equipment and provided ongoing assistance with telephones, computers, internet and satellite connections and were at CDOC Headquarters for Web page updates. 8. The Executive Director, Director of Prisons, Director of Administration and Finance assisted prior to arrival on site and provided direction regarding use of chemical agents and other strategies to quell the riot. Further, they provided command management regarding building sweeps, detainment and control of inmates, yard supervision and emergency food service operations. Coordination and planning with the SORT Commander was ongoing over the next 24 hours. 9. Facility Emergency Response Teams from Arkansas Valley, Fort Lyon, San Carlos and Trinidad Correctional Facilities reported to the SORT 63 Commander, along with staff from the Youthful Offender System (YOS) and Pueblo Minimum Center and some off-duty staff who reside in the Colorado Springs area. These teams were instrumental in providing assistance during the riot and regaining control of the facility. 10. YOS management team developed a plan to receive inmates from CCCF and provide appropriate services. 11. Central Transport Unit was alerted that inmates would be moved to available beds throughout the state. 12. The Inspector General and staff provided assistance during and after the riot, identified potential crime scenes, began to conduct investigations and have since assimilated over 1,400 interview documents related to the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident. At approximately 1:00 A.M., on July 21, 2004, the riot was brought under control and the process of restoring order began. Inmates were restrained and staged in exercise yards. A process for medical triage was and treatment was established. Criminal Charges At this writing, there is an ongoing investigation to determine the filing of criminal cases. Conservatively, over 100 inmates have been identified as engaging in criminal activity, and 100 or more Disciplinary or Administrative actions may be pursued against inmate suspects. The Office of the Inspector General reports that additional criminal related incidents may include the following: 1. Attempted Homicide of at least one inmate. 2. Inmates inciting and engaging in large scale riot activity. 3. Large scale Criminal Mischief with major property damage. 4. Assaults on inmates by inmates. 5. Assaults or attempted assaults on staff by inmates. 6. Burglary of Case Management offices and destruction of records and files. 7. Burglary of Living Unit Control Centers and destruction therein. 8. Arson and attempted burning of Living Units. 9. Arson of the Greenhouse. 10. Burglary of Programs Area, Building G. 11. Accosting and robbing two civilian electrical contractors of their tool belts containing screw drivers and wire cutters, instruments which could aid in a potential escape. 64 Part IV: Conclusions and Recommendations Conclusions After any prison disturbance, hindsight is useful for drawing conclusions about missed operational opportunities. Every attempt should be made to analyze the causes of the riot, its human and financial impact and address steps needed to make appropriate improvements. After a comprehensive review of the July 20 inmate riot, the Colorado Department of Corrections concludes the following: • CCCF management has failed to comply in a timely manner with PPMU-noted deficiencies/recommendations. • High staff attrition rate and inexperience has contributed to lack of ability to appropriately respond to emergencies. At this writing, 37 CCCF staff members have resigned or been terminated since the incident. • Responsiveness to inmates’ food service complaints has been delayed. There has been a failure to adhere to CDOC mandated menu items. • Fundamental security measures have not been consistently followed. • Facility emergency plan has not been effective. • Inmate living unit construction materials have proven to be easily destroyed. • CCCF’s initial response to the incident was indecisive. • The riot and subsequent damage to CCCF has caused a disruption of daily inmate intake into the Reception and Diagnostic Center resulting in an increase in jail backlog. The impact of the incident to normal operations of population management has been enormous. Inmate movement back into CCCF by CDOC has ceased to date. Recommendations The following recommendations are being made as a result of this report: 65 • Update facility emergency procedures and schedule training drills on a frequent basis, utilizing corporate resources; conduct necessary out briefings and implement corrections. • Ensure command structure is well-defined with clear lines of authority and responsibility and organizational chart updated. • CCA should consider granting more authority to CCCF’s on site command staff in emergency situations. • Conduct frequent staff and inmate accountability exercises with and without observation from PPMU staff. Conduct needed out briefings and implement corrections. • Increase the level and frequency of communications with corporate officials when corrective measures, indicated by PPMU, are not implemented in a timely manner at the local level. • Increase notification and level of accountability among county commissioners and city administrators to the Department of Corrections for private prison operational deficiencies, when noted by PPMU. • Increase the level of oversight by County Commissioners and city administrators for private prison operations. • Review and update memorandums of understanding with county and city officials and local law enforcement. • Practice mobilization of emergency command center at various times, during all shifts. • Review CCCF’s staffing complements for emergency response teams and inventory equipment and supplies; ensure use of force training records are current and updated as needed. • Conduct tool and key control audits to CDOC specification. • Respond to inmate complaints in a timely manner. • Consider a change in the food service contractor; ensure food service staff are trained in the preparation of medical and religious diets. • Provide CCCF staff with use of force and tactical training. • Provide CCCF staff with hazardous materials and blood spill cleanup training • Review security procedures regarding recreational use of weights. • Replace current wooden doors and porcelain plumbing fixtures and locking mechanisms. • Implement a method for improved security of inmate files. • Create mechanism to address issues of CCCF staff morale. • Conduct regularly scheduled inspections of living unit control center escape hatch. 66 • Ensure only trained and credentialed armorer is authorized to issue weapons and munitions. • Maintain a list of contingent contract providers should additional or alternate bed space needs arise. • Request the Colorado Legislature for additional full time employees for the CDOC Private Prisons Monitoring Unit. • Request the Colorado Legislature to authorize the CDOC Executive Director to take command and compel compliance with recommended policy and procedure in non-emergency situations. • Report to PPMU all instances of shift staffing shortages. • Conduct appropriate investigations, prior to inmate COPD hearings taking place. About Emergency Preparedness Unexpected occurrences, acts of God, and a variety of other anomalies can disturb a correctional facility at any time and pose a threat to security. Contingency plans must be developed, training conducted and plans implemented when needed. Inmate disturbances are one of the most serious of these unplanned events. Appropriately responding to such emergencies and taking control of a potentially volatile situation comes with practice. In all cases, inmates far outnumber staff; therefore, strategies should be developed to mobilize the work force in such a way as to firmly and aggressively take control of a situation using the least amount of force necessary. Confidence about what to do and how to execute an emergency plan is possible only after training, an updated review of procedures and re-training. An arsenal of specialized equipment and other supplies should be pre-positioned. Communication systems must be tested and utilized, and leadership during such an emergency well established. All the preparation in the world, however, means nothing if the plan is not implemented, or when employees fail to execute their roles, accordingly. In either state or privately operated prisons, complacency is the enemy. Inmates capitalize on their observation of staff taking shortcuts and exploit weaknesses whenever possible. Failure to recognize or report unusual inmate behaviors may ultimately lead to a disruption within the institution. Often, staff place little importance on individual observations; and, while it is true that separately some reports lack significance, collectively, they may be of great use. When patterns emerge and are investigated, disturbances may be 67 prevented. The ability to respond to emergencies is often hindered, therefore, not by a desire to perform, but due to inexperience and lack of practice. In short, proactive planning and reactive problem-solving are essential. A thorough after action review of any facility emergency is important in order to recognize systems that functioned well and those that need improvement. This review process has provided CDOC with the opportunity to examine internal Private Prisons Monitoring Unit practices, and the Unit looks forward to identifying ways to increase effectiveness. For example, it has become evident that the PPMU needs to involve and communicate with the contracting city and county officials to obtain compliance and correct deficiencies noted when they are conducting inspections. While not every emergency can be prepared for, common procedures for responding to any emergency, can, never the less, be practiced. Since staff from all operational and program areas will likely be utilized during an actual riot, such as described in this report, frequent rehearsal is necessary with everyone in the facility participating. Correctional agencies should also account for staff attrition and retrain in emergency procedures as needed. On the night of the incident, there were many CCCF staff who responded appropriately and performed well. Local fire protection units, police and sheriff’s officers, state patrol and others were quick to initiate measures to ensure the public’s safety was never compromised. After the facility’s order was restored, countless hours have been spent in reviewing the levels of response and discussing ways to improve processes in the future. The prison riot of July 20, 2004, at the Crowley County Correctional Facility began with a disturbance which, in retrospect, was not responded to as quickly and effectively as possible, thus developing into a riot. Some dynamics among the inmate population, perception that inmate complaints were not being heard and use of force by CCCF staff likely all contributed to the onset of the incident. This report was an attempt to summarize the events and provide recommendations for improvement in order to mitigate such occurrences in the future. 68 Appendices 69 Appendices: Page: Photos: 70 – 89 Intergovernmental Contract – State of Colorado and the Colorado Department of Corrections and Crowley County and Exhibits 90– 176 Crowley County Correctional Facility Riot Response Expenses to be Reimbursed 177 Glossary 178 Unit I: Inmates set fires to wooden cell doors. 70 Debris resulting from fires set to washing machines, vending machines, clothing and files. Housing Unit Control Center: Inmates used weights to break windows and destroy locking mechanisms to access control centers and electronic panels. 71 Unit 1: Inmates damaged air handling units after accessing roof through escape hatch, above control center. Unit 1: Fire damage 72 Unit 1: Fire Damage Housing Unit 1: Roof and fire damage 73 Housing Unit: Day Hall flooding and debris Unit 3: Debris at housing unit’s entrance 74 Locking mechanism destroyed by weight bar Housing Unit 4: Burned debris 75 Housing Unit: Inmates moved and destroyed institution property, files and clothing to outside entrance of cell house. Defeated locking mechanism 76 Housing Unit: Damage to sheetrock and flooding 77 78 Housing Unit: Flooding of Day Hall area near entrance Housing Unit Control Center: Inmates gained access and damaged sprinkler systems, control panel and windows overlooking unit. 79 Housing Unit: Shattered windows overlooking cells Housing Unit Control Center: Electronic panel destroyed 80 Housing Unit: Destruction of porcelain fixtures Housing Unit Day Hall Area: Washer and dryer removed 81 Housing Unit: Case Managers’ file cabinets and inmate records destroyed 82 Housing Unit: Inmates used weight bars and clothing irons to destroy sheetrock Housing Unit Control Center: Windows broken by inmates throwing projectiles 83 Segregation Unit: Cell damage and flooding 84 Segregation Housing Unit: Door damage, day room and cell flooding Segregation Unit: Cell door compromised, porcelain fixtures destroyed; flooding 85 Segregation Unit: Concrete block walls destroyed by weight bars 86 Segregation Unit: Pod damage 87 Segregation Unit: Flooding damage and steel door defeated 88 Segregation Unit: View from inside destroyed cell 89 90 90 91 91 92 92 93 93 94 94 95 95 96 96 97 97 98 98 99 99 100 100 101 101 102 102 103 103 104 104 105 90 106 90 107 90 108 90 109 90 110 90 111 90 112 90 113 90 114 90 115 90 116 90 117 90 118 90 119 90 120 90 121 90 122 90 123 90 124 90 125 90 126 90 127 90 128 90 129 90 130 90 131 90 132 90 133 90 134 90 135 90 136 90 137 90 138 90 139 90 140 90 141 90 142 90 143 90 144 90 145 90 146 90 147 90 148 90 149 90 150 90 151 90 152 90 153 90 154 90 155 90 156 90 157 90 158 90 159 90 160 90 161 90 162 90 163 90 164 90 165 90 166 90 167 90 168 90 169 90 170 90 171 90 172 90 173 90 174 90 175 90 176 90 Crowley County Correctional Facility Riot Response July 20, 2004 Direct Expenses to be Reimbursed Personnel $225,228.22 Travel 1,508.53 Clothing 1,554.43 Medical 116,573.48 Other 40,760.29 Total Reimbursement: $385,624.95 177 Glossary AVCF: BCCF: CBI: CCA: CCCF: CCF: CDOC: CM: CO: COPD: CSP: CTA: CTU: DTR: EMCC: ERT: ESC: FLCF: GP: HCCF: IDO: KCCC: LAN: LCF: PIO: PMC: PPMU: SCCF: SORT: STG: TCCF: YOS: Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility Bent County Correctional Facility Colorado Bureau of Investigation Corrections Corporation of America Crowley County Correctional Facility Centennial Correctional Facility Colorado Department of Corrections Case Manager Correctional Officer Code of Penal Discipline Colorado State Penitentiary Corrections Training Academy Central Transportation Unit Digital Transmission Radio Emergency Mobile Command Center Emergency Response Team Emergency Support Center Fort Lyon Correctional Facility General Professional Huerfano County Correctional Facility Intake, Diagnostic, & Orientation Kit Carson Correctional Center Local Area Network Limon Correctional Facility Public Information Officer Pueblo Minimum Center Private Prisons Monitoring Unit San Carlos Correctional Facility Special Operations Response Team Security Threat Group Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility Youth Offender Services 178